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Introduction	  	   The	  study	  behind	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  examine	  how	  Syria	  can	  rebuild	  its	  country	  as	  a	  democracy	  after	  the	  Assad	  regime.	  The	  country	  has	  undergone	  a	  civil	  war	  since	  2011,	  after	  Syrian	  teens	  were	  arrested	  for	  writing	  political	  graffiti.	  While	  this	  wasn’t	  the	  spark	  of	  the	  Assad	  regime	  and	  the	  Syrian	  revolution,	  it	  was	  the	  start	  of	  the	  uprisings	  in	  the	  country.	  Earlier	  2011	  activism	  by	  Egypt	  and	  Tunisia	  inspired	  Syrian	  protestors	  to	  demonstrate	  against	  Ba’athist	  party	  president,	  Bashar	  al-­‐Assad.	  Unlike	  Arab	  Spring	  uprising	  in	  the	  other	  two	  countries,	  the	  Syrian	  government	  responded	  very	  aggressively	  to	  the	  activists.	  A	  country,	  once	  rich	  in	  culture	  and	  life,	  has	  fallen	  into	  ruins	  after	  the	  Al-­‐Assad	  government	  took	  forceful	  action	  against	  the	  citizens,	  who	  came	  together	  to	  demand	  a	  change	  in	  the	  long-­‐corrupted	  system	  of	  government	  they	  lived	  under.	  A	  country	  that	  once	  thrived	  in	  culture	  and	  history	  is	  now	  packed	  with	  ruins	  and	  pieces	  of	  life.	  Chemical	  bombs	  dropped	  and	  killed	  thousands	  of	  mothers	  and	  children.	  I’ve	  chosen	  to	  surround	  my	  research	  around	  how	  Syria	  can	  rebuild	  a	  democratic	  government	  post-­‐Assad	  regime.	  Considering	  that	  Syria	  is	  not	  only	  undergoing	  the	  Assad	  regime,	  but	  also	  invasion	  by	  the	  Islamic	  State	  (ISIS)	  a	  potential	  proposal	  of	  new	  government	  is	  very	  far	  away.	  However,	  I	  have	  spent	  this	  year	  studying	  the	  history	  of	  government	  in	  Syria,	  as	  well	  as	  understanding	  the	  characteristics	  of	  developing	  a	  democracy.	  Unlike	  the	  revolutions	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  throughout	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	  Syria	  has	  fallen	  into	  a	  separate	  category.	  Rather	  than	  watch	  the	  government	  responds	  proactively	  to	  the	  uproar	  of	  the	  citizens,	  Bashar	  Al-­‐Assad	  has	  maintained	  the	  long-­‐living	  iron-­‐grip	  on	  the	  country.	  In	  a	  realistic	  perspective,	  the	  situation	  in	  Syria	  will	  continue	  to	  deteriorate	  for	  many	  years.	  Considering	  the	  growth	  of	  ISIS	  in	  major	  parts	  of	  the	  
5	  	  country,	  with	  more	  than	  30,000	  militants	  seizing	  several	  areas	  of	  the	  country,	  a	  bright	  future	  looks	  unlikely1.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  my	  research,	  I	  approached	  my	  sources	  and	  ideas	  with	  the	  perspective	  that	  there	  was	  one	  specific	  framework	  that	  would	  help	  solve	  the	  crisis	  in	  Syria.	  	  While	  I	  still	  believe	  this	  is	  true,	  I’ve	  taken	  into	  considering	  the	  advancing	  state	  of	  the	  country.	  President	  Obama	  recently	  approached	  his	  national	  security	  to	  review	  U.S.	  policy	  towards	  Syria,	  explaining	  that	  defeating	  ISIS	  would	  not	  happen	  without	  a	  political	  transition	  in	  the	  country,	  therefore	  removing	  Assad	  from	  power2.	  While	  I	  believe	  this	  is	  a	  realistic	  approach,	  President	  Obama’s	  suggestion	  comes	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  baggage.	  First	  of	  all,	  if	  we	  were	  to	  intervene	  with	  a	  political	  transition	  in	  Syria,	  there	  would	  have	  to	  be	  a	  standby	  government	  to	  take	  over	  once	  Assad	  is	  out	  of	  power.	  If	  the	  country	  goes	  under	  no	  government	  for	  even	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  time,	  this	  would	  hold	  great	  meaning	  to	  ISIS’	  growth.	  	  	   With	  this	  being	  said,	  the	  goal	  of	  my	  research	  is	  to	  propose	  a	  sequence	  of	  potential	  resolutions	  to	  the	  crisis	  in	  Syria.	  Ultimately,	  my	  goal	  is	  identify	  the	  components	  of	  democratization	  and	  apply	  them	  to	  the	  state.	  However,	  I	  want	  to	  stress	  that	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  framework	  I	  applied	  will	  ultimately	  be	  realistic.	  For	  that	  reason,	  I	  will	  analyze	  another	  potential	  resolution	  that	  could	  take	  place	  in	  Syria	  that	  will	  apply	  current	  events	  and	  foreign	  affairs	  occurring	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  international	  community.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  estimated	  the	  number	  of	  ISIS	  fighters	  around	  31,000.	  Number	  amounts	  have	  differed	  between	  Intelligence	  and	  the	  Pentagon,	  but	  it	  is	  undeniable	  that	  there	  has	  been	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  fighters	  (Winderm).	  2	  President	  Obama’s	  review	  request	  asked	  that	  we	  confront	  ISIS	  in	  Iraq	  first,	  then	  take	  on	  group	  fighters	  in	  Syria.	  Officials	  have	  said	  there	  is	  no	  formal	  strategy	  review,	  but	  that	  the	  president	  wants	  to	  degrade	  ISIL	  without	  ending	  support	  for	  the	  opposition	  (rebels),	  but	  also	  cross	  the	  course	  of	  the	  Assad	  regime	  (Labott).	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The	  House	  of	  Assad	  Why	  has	  the	  war	  in	  Syria	  carried	  on	  for	  so	  long?	  As	  I	  said	  earlier,	  it’s	  the	  only	  country	  involved	  in	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  that	  still	  continues	  to	  struggle	  to	  break	  off	  from	  the	  iron-­‐grip	  of	  Bashar	  al-­‐Assad.	  But	  the	  iron-­‐grip	  rule	  of	  the	  family	  is	  no	  stranger	  to	  the	  people.	  The	  country	  has	  long	  lived	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  Assad	  family,	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  election	  of	  the	  late	  Hafez	  al-­‐Assad,	  who	  showed	  Syria	  ups	  and	  downs	  that	  may	  have	  lasted	  them	  a	  lifetime.	  Hafez	  was	  the	  president	  of	  Syria	  from	  1971-­‐2000,	  and	  after	  his	  death,	  Bashar	  succeeded	  him.	  A	  unique	  aspect	  of	  Hafez’s	  presidency	  is	  his	  use	  of	  Soviet	  aid	  to	  build	  his	  military.	  Even	  in	  the	  current	  state	  of	  regime	  in	  Syria,	  the	  military	  continues	  to	  remain	  a	  definite	  alliance	  to	  the	  government,	  and	  Russia	  has	  promised	  its	  commitment	  to	  vetoing	  any	  sanctions	  proposed	  against	  Syria	  by	  the	  Security	  Council,	  as	  well	  as	  standing	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  with	  their	  government.	  First	  of	  all,	  Hafez’s	  presidency	  in	  no	  way	  properly	  represented	  the	  claimed	  “Semi-­‐presidential”	  government	  the	  country	  has.	  Syria	  is	  built	  with	  the	  president,	  a	  prime	  minister	  and	  a	  cabinet.	  But	  Hafez’s	  presidency	  succeeded	  with	  his	  commitment	  to	  instilling	  the	  Baath	  party	  into	  all	  aspects	  of	  life	  in	  Syria3.	  In	  a	  brief	  sense,	  the	  Baath	  Party	  under	  Hafez	  aimed	  to	  have	  secularism,	  socialism,	  and	  freedom	  from	  Western	  influence	  as	  objectives	  that	  infiltrated	  the	  country.	  In	  1973,	  under	  the	  Hafez	  leadership,	  the	  constitution	  was	  amended	  to	  create	  the	  Baath	  Party	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  state	  and	  society,	  which	  forced	  it	  into	  all	  areas	  of	  civilian	  life.	  Basically,	  the	  aim	  of	  instilling	  the	  party	  as	  a	  national	  movement	  was	  to	  spread	  the	  authoritative	  instruction	  from	  a	  central	  government	  level	  to	  government	  representatives.	  The	  party’s	  ideology	  was	  brought	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  party	  aimed	  to	  have	  pan-­‐Arab	  unification.	  But	  the	  transition	  from	  being	  a	  socialist	  movement	  to	  a	  nationalist	  movement	  is	  what	  brought	  the	  Assad	  family	  to	  power	  in	  Syria	  (Langley).	  
7	  	  at	  an	  elementary	  level	  for	  children,	  and	  Baathist	  members	  controlled	  many	  areas	  of	  the	  public	  sector,	  including	  military	  and	  armed	  forces4.	  The	  Assad	  reign	  was	  the	  result	  of	  an	  altered	  constitution.	  In	  1971,	  Hafez	  won	  the	  elections	  with	  an	  appalling	  99.2%	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  Syria.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  his	  success,	  the	  country	  adopted	  a	  constitution	  that	  laid	  out	  their	  power,	  and	  officially	  made	  the	  Baath	  Party	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  state	  and	  society.	  Along	  with	  this,	  the	  constitution	  gave	  the	  president	  monopoly	  power	  through	  the	  party’s	  regulations.	  This	  means,	  that	  even	  now,	  if	  there	  were	  transparent,	  unrigged,	  and	  fair	  elections	  in	  the	  country,	  the	  constitution,	  although	  amended	  after	  Hafez’s	  death,	  will	  give	  Assad	  the	  win	  based	  off	  of	  the	  constitutional	  powers5.	  
The	  Start	  of	  Political	  Uprisings	  The	  uprisings	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  began	  when	  Egyptian	  citizens	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  to	  call	  for	  the	  removal	  of	  long-­‐time	  leader,	  Hosni	  Mubarak.	  While	  the	  sight	  of	  citizens	  gathering	  in	  the	  masses	  to	  protest	  corruption	  was	  a	  sight	  of	  inspiration	  for	  fellow	  states,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  realization	  of	  living	  under	  corrupt	  and	  excluded	  rule	  for	  so	  long	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  uprisings.	  These	  citizens,	  whether	  in	  Egypt,	  Tunisia,	  or	  any	  Middle	  Eastern	  country,	  had	  been	  subjected	  to	  denigrate	  rule	  and	  denial	  of	  rightful	  freedoms.	  The	  use	  of	  public	  space	  as	  a	  means	  of	  mobilized	  political	  force	  acted	  as	  a	  way	  for	  the	  citizens	  to	  express	  a	  common	  demand,	  although	  their	  opinion	  on	  who	  should	  replace	  the	  regime	  was	  not	  the	  same.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Syria,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  continuous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  They	  also	  controlled	  trade	  unions,	  and	  their	  reservations	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  helped	  boost	  their	  party	  membership	  (BBC:	  Syria’s	  Ruling	  Baath	  Party).	  	  5	  Assad’s	  leadership	  in	  Syria	  did	  not	  start	  off	  as	  anything	  welcoming	  and	  exciting	  to	  the	  country.	  Hafez’s	  creation	  and	  adaptation	  to	  the	  Syrian	  Constitution	  is	  what	  solidified	  him	  in	  his	  position,	  and	  locked	  the	  family	  as	  leaders	  of	  the	  state	  for	  years	  to	  come	  (Fares).	  
8	  	  oppressions	  and	  forced	  rulings	  by	  Assad	  is	  what	  pushed	  the	  people	  into	  retaliation	  against	  the	  government.	  	  The	  protests	  in	  Syria	  sparked	  in	  early	  2011	  after	  teenagers	  were	  arrested	  and	  tortured	  who	  painted	  revolutionary	  slogans	  on	  a	  school	  wall.	  Armed	  forces	  fired	  at	  the	  protestors,	  only	  pushing	  more	  out	  to	  the	  streets	  of	  Syria.	  As	  the	  months	  went	  on,	  the	  country	  was	  divided	  between	  the	  regime	  and	  the	  opposition,	  creating	  a	  civil	  war	  in	  Syria.	  While	  the	  war	  may	  have	  started	  as	  a	  divide	  between	  Assad	  supporters,	  it’s	  expanded	  into	  a	  religious	  battle	  between	  the	  Sunni	  majority	  and	  the	  government’s	  Shia	  Alawite	  sect.	  This	  religious	  fight	  has	  continued	  to	  involve	  neighboring	  countries,	  and	  now,	  the	  Islamic	  State	  (ISIS),	  which	  has	  maintained	  a	  home	  inside	  of	  Syria6.	  More	  than	  200,000	  lives	  have	  been	  lost	  in	  the	  four	  years	  of	  this	  civil	  war.	  A	  battle	  that	  began	  with	  anti-­‐government	  protests	  turned	  into	  a	  war	  that	  displaced	  millions	  and	  divided	  a	  country	  into	  pieces.	  While	  this	  thesis	  will	  examine	  a	  democratization	  transition	  after	  the	  Assad	  government,	  there	  are	  different	  players	  that	  will	  participate	  in	  the	  explanation	  of	  this	  process.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  my	  research	  in	  2013,	  my	  sole	  focus	  was	  to	  examine	  the	  Assad	  regime	  from	  all	  aspects.	  As	  the	  months	  carried	  on,	  the	  Islamic	  State	  came	  into	  play	  and	  influenced	  my	  research.	  Rather	  than	  focus	  entirely	  on	  a	  free	  Syria	  post-­‐Assad,	  I	  am	  examining	  the	  process	  of	  democratizing	  the	  country	  after	  his	  exit,	  along	  with	  defeating	  the	  Islamic	  State.	  Even	  if	  the	  Assad	  government	  is	  overthrown,	  a	  free	  Syria	  will	  not	  exist	  as	  long	  as	  ISIS	  controls	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  (Syria:	  The	  Story	  of	  the	  Conflict).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	  Alawite’s	  gained	  power	  in	  Syria	  because	  of	  the	  Baath	  Party’s	  influence.	  The	  UN	  has	  evidence	  of	  war	  crimes	  occurring	  since	  the	  conflict	  started	  in	  2011,	  including	  accusations	  of	  blocking	  access	  to	  food,	  water,	  and	  health	  services	  to	  civilians	  by	  the	  government	  rebel	  forces	  (BBC:	  Syria:	  The	  Story	  of	  the	  Conflict).	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Syria	  and	  the	  Islamic	  State	  	   When	  the	  Assad	  regime	  first	  began	  back	  in	  late	  2010,	  the	  only	  terroristic	  group	  that	  was	  a	  fear	  to	  the	  people	  and	  outside	  governments	  was	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  regime	  themselves.	  However,	  within	  the	  last	  year,	  the	  Islamic	  State	  has	  identified	  itself	  as	  an	  extremist	  movement	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  has	  nested	  in	  Syria	  and	  Iraq.	  	  The	  Islamic	  State,	  who	  also	  identify	  themselves	  as	  ISIS/ISIL	  is	  made	  from	  the	  remnants	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	  and	  Hussein	  supporters.	  The	  group	  has	  clearly	  represented	  their	  disapproval	  of	  Western	  influence	  on	  Islamic	  society	  and	  way	  of	  life,	  and	  have	  used	  global	  media	  as	  an	  outlet	  to	  deliver	  their	  messages	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  	   	  	  	   Iraq	  has	  been	  homeland	  for	  ISIS	  members	  because	  the	  core	  of	  their	  agenda	  seems	  to	  be	  based	  off	  the	  idea	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Shiite	  Muslims	  of	  Iraq	  and	  develop	  an	  Islamic	  State	  guided	  by	  religious	  scholars	  under	  the	  reign	  of	  the	  caliph—a	  successor	  of	  the	  Prophet	  Mohammad	  (PBUH).	  Their	  strategies	  of	  developing	  this	  Islamic	  State	  are	  based	  off	  the	  extreme	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Quran	  and	  Islamic	  religion.	  In	  a	  simple	  perspective,	  the	  mix	  of	  Western	  society	  in	  Islam	  has	  buried	  the	  true	  meaning	  of	  the	  religion	  and	  corrupted	  it	  entirely.	  So,	  the	  Islamic	  State’s	  mission	  is	  to	  rebuild	  what	  the	  ideologies	  of	  Islam,	  and	  the	  proper	  way	  of	  life,	  that	  the	  West	  has	  destroyed.	  For	  Iraq,	  the	  goal	  of	  ISIS	  is	  to	  recreate	  the	  Shiite	  government	  into	  a	  Sunni	  Islamic	  State.	  ISIS	  has	  targeted	  Christian	  and	  Shiite	  Muslim	  citizens	  in	  Iraq,	  and	  has	  attempted	  to	  seize	  cities	  with	  high	  populations	  of	  both	  religions	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  control	  and	  rebuild	  them	  based	  off	  of	  the	  Islamic	  State	  agenda7.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  NBC’s	  continuous	  coverage	  of	  ISIS	  and	  their	  threat	  had	  a	  storyline	  article	  explaining	  the	  details	  of	  what	  ISIS	  wanted.	  Johnson’s	  explanations	  went	  into	  goals	  of	  restoring	  the	  caliphate,	  gaining	  territory,	  recruiting	  followers,	  as	  well	  as	  generating	  money	  and	  revenge	  against	  America	  (Johnson).	  
10	  	  	   Before	  I	  approach	  the	  relations	  between	  ISIS	  and	  the	  Syrian	  regime,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  points	  I	  want	  to	  readdress	  regarding	  the	  Syrian	  rebels.	  To	  make	  it	  clear,	  ISIS	  is	  disconnected	  from	  the	  Syrian	  army	  and	  the	  Syrian	  government.	  As	  I	  said	  earlier,	  the	  opposition	  did	  not	  start	  out	  as	  a	  rebel	  organization,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  group	  of	  peaceful	  protestors	  against	  the	  Assad	  presidency.	  As	  the	  calls	  for	  reforms	  against	  the	  government	  spread	  across	  the	  country,	  the	  protestors	  became	  the	  Free	  Syrian	  Army	  and	  promised	  a	  war	  against	  Assad.	  Now,	  a	  disadvantage	  of	  the	  FSA	  that	  stands	  in	  the	  way	  of	  the	  international	  community	  is	  that	  some	  of	  the	  rebel	  groups	  within	  the	  organization	  are	  linked	  with	  Al	  Qaeda,	  which	  has	  been	  a	  setback	  to	  gain	  powerful	  support.	  	  	   With	  the	  terror	  that	  the	  Assad	  government	  has	  already	  imposed	  on	  Syria,	  ISIS	  has	  brought	  outside	  pressures	  and	  attacks	  into	  the	  country.	  Because	  of	  the	  civil	  war	  in	  Syria,	  the	  inter-­‐rebel	  presence	  between	  the	  Syrian	  rebels	  and	  ISIS	  has	  caused	  tension	  in	  the	  country	  and	  has	  not	  improved	  the	  state	  of	  terror	  that	  the	  country	  is	  undergoing	  under	  Assad.	  Contrary	  to	  common	  belief,	  ISIS	  is	  not	  working	  with	  the	  Syrian	  rebels	  against	  the	  government	  regime.	  The	  Syrian	  National	  Coalition	  serves	  as	  an	  official	  liaison	  to	  the	  U.S.	  regarding	  political	  matters	  and	  humanitarian	  aid	  to	  Syria.	  Earlier	  this	  year,	  they	  released	  a	  statement	  explaining	  their	  belief	  that	  ISIS	  is	  closely	  linked	  with	  the	  Assad	  regime	  and	  is	  working	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  Al-­‐Assad.	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  statement	  from	  the	  SNC,	  leaders	  from	  different	  Syrian	  rebel	  groups	  have	  blamed	  ISIS	  for	  the	  war	  between	  the	  organizations.	  They’ve	  called	  out	  ISIS	  incapability	  of	  recognizing	  itself	  as	  a	  group	  amongst	  other	  groups,	  not	  the	  only	  opposing	  organization	  in	  the	  country.	  Hassan	  Aboud,	  who	  is	  head	  of	  the	  political	  bureau	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  of	  the	  Islamic	  Front—a	  merger	  of	  the	  rebel	  groups	  involved	  in	  the	  civil	  war—called	  out	  ISIS	  for	  their	  aggressiveness	  towards	  rebel	  resources	  and	  territory.	  In	  his	  interview,	  he	  said	  that	  ISIS	  “attacked	  many	  other	  groups,	  stole	  their	  weapons,	  [and]	  occupied	  their	  headquarters”	  (Landis).	  ISIS	  has	  made	  no	  efforts	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  rebels,	  but	  rather	  sees	  itself	  as	  a	  unique	  beneficiary	  to	  Syria	  and	  has	  set	  up	  its	  own	  establishment	  wherever	  they	  decide.	  As	  Abu	  Ibrahim	  told	  me,	  it’s	  in	  the	  benefit	  of	  ISIS	  and	  the	  regime	  to	  work	  together.	  	  	   In	  the	  beginning	  stages	  of	  my	  research,	  ISIS	  did	  not	  have	  a	  big	  role	  because	  they	  were	  not	  as	  prevalent.	  My	  understandings	  of	  the	  democratization	  frameworks	  made	  sense	  to	  me	  because	  I	  was	  dealing	  with	  a	  country	  divided	  by	  civil	  war.	  While	  Huntington’s	  frameworks	  and	  explanations	  of	  democratization	  theories	  and	  guidelines	  were	  thorough	  and	  helpful,	  I	  believe	  that	  they	  put	  me	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  when	  ISIS	  continued	  to	  grow.	  As	  I	  begin	  applying	  and	  analyzing	  the	  frameworks	  I	  have	  researched,	  I	  want	  to	  stress	  that	  as	  I	  analyze	  hypothetical	  scenarios,	  I	  am	  doing	  so	  based	  off	  of	  idea	  and	  understanding.	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  hypotheticals	  that	  I	  have	  created	  in	  my	  research	  help	  compliment	  the	  fundamentals	  of	  what	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  explain.	  I	  am	  not	  a	  political	  scholar,	  however,	  I	  believe	  that	  my	  level	  of	  understanding	  of	  the	  regime	  and	  the	  frameworks	  allows	  me	  to	  exercise	  these	  hypotheticals	  within	  reason.	  	  
	  
Democracy:	  How	  is	  it	  created?	  I’ve	  found	  that	  there	  is	  a	  strongly	  developed	  framework	  for	  how	  a	  democracy	  is	  created.	  The	  center	  of	  my	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  methodological	  framework	  provided	  by	  Samuel	  Huntington	  in	  The	  Third	  Wave:	  Democratization	  in	  the	  Late	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Twentieth	  Century.	  Huntington	  outlines	  and	  identifies	  the	  wave	  of	  democracy,	  which	  is	  a	  change	  that	  has	  helped	  the	  world	  transition	  to	  create	  democracy.	  Before	  I	  go	  into	  the	  explanation	  of	  Huntington’s	  framework	  and	  Syria,	  I	  want	  to	  clarify	  that	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  recognize	  Syria’s	  government	  type	  as	  a	  Republic	  under	  Authoritarian	  Rule.	  Assad	  has	  not	  announced	  himself	  dictator	  of	  the	  country,	  and	  the	  people	  are	  still	  free	  to	  live	  under	  their	  natural-­‐given	  freedoms,	  which	  are	  outlined	  and	  chosen	  by	  the	  government	  itself.	  Huntington	  explains	  that	  the	  first	  step	  of	  democratization	  involves	  ending	  an	  authoritarian	  regime.	  However,	  he	  points	  out	  at	  that	  ending	  a	  nondemocratic	  regime	  does	  not	  necessarily	  promise	  a	  transition	  into	  a	  democratic	  one,	  but	  proposes	  the	  potential	  for	  another	  nondemocratic	  regime	  to	  take	  its	  place	  (35).	  	  In	  terms	  of	  Syria,	  Bashar	  inherited	  the	  seat	  from	  his	  father	  one	  month	  after	  Hafez’s	  passing,	  winning	  at	  an	  unopposed	  97%	  approval	  rating	  by	  the	  people.	  Congress	  of	  Syria	  scratched	  off	  the	  age	  requirement	  of	  40	  years	  to	  put	  Bashar	  into	  power.	  In	  The	  Third	  Wave:	  Democratization	  in	  the	  Late	  Twentieth	  Century,	  Samuel	  Huntington	  aims	  to	  break	  down	  the	  process	  of	  building	  a	  democracy	  through	  a	  waves	  process.	  Rather	  than	  using	  the	  approach	  of	  immediately	  overthrowing	  the	  authoritarian	  leadership	  and	  replacing	  it	  with	  a	  citizen-­‐elected	  government,	  Huntington	  sets	  out	  the	  steps	  to	  approach	  democratization	  without	  completely	  destroying	  the	  system.	  I’ve	  understood	  Huntington’s	  method	  to	  break	  down	  the	  democratic	  system	  to	  create	  an	  arrangement	  that	  criticize	  the	  traditional	  democratic	  structure	  of	  a	  normal	  democracy	  and	  replaces	  with	  it	  with	  a	  framework	  that	  has	  paved	  the	  road	  for	  democracies	  in	  the	  latest	  wave.	  This	  structure	  is	  based	  off	  the	  democratizing	  regime	  changes	  produced	  in	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  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  that	  carried	  onto	  be	  applied	  as	  variable	  players	  in	  examining	  democratizing	  regime	  changes	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	  	  Huntington’	  framework	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  following	  steps.	  The	  first	  is	  targeting	  validity	  of	  iron-­‐gripped	  authoritarian	  regimes	  with	  broken	  military	  systems	  and	  economic	  deterioration.	  	  By	  this,	  Huntington	  explains	  that	  this	  step	  serves	  to	  prove	  the	  declining	  legitimacy	  of	  once	  promising	  regimes	  by	  exposing	  their	  ability	  to	  stand	  by	  promised	  reforms.	  The	  structure	  of	  these	  pre-­‐democratized	  authoritarian	  regimes	  is,	  that	  the	  internal	  structure	  of	  the	  regime,	  involving	  all	  the	  authoritarian	  key	  leaders,	  is	  kind	  of	  like	  musical	  chairs.	  All	  the	  participants	  involved	  in	  the	  authoritarian	  government	  stick	  around	  in	  hopes	  of	  getting	  their	  chance	  at	  being	  a	  leader.	  What	  Huntington	  has	  explained,	  and	  what	  I	  have	  understood,	  is	  that	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  is	  welcomed	  because	  of	  a	  failed	  imitation	  of	  a	  potential	  democratic	  government	  in	  the	  country8.	  The	  regimes	  based	  their	  objectives	  based	  on	  democratic	  rhetoric,	  and	  that	  a	  democratic	  structure	  would	  emerge	  once	  the	  government	  solved	  the	  problems	  confronting	  the	  society.	  So,	  this	  creates	  the	  ideology	  that	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  wants	  to	  take	  care	  of	  the	  conflicts	  preventing	  the	  society	  from	  advancing	  forward,	  and	  then	  they’ll	  apply	  a	  democratic	  structure	  to	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  (47-­‐49).	  	  The	  second	  step	  in	  the	  wave	  structure	  is	  the	  growth	  of	  economies	  in	  newly	  democratic	  states,	  along	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  education	  and	  higher	  living	  standards.	  In	  this	  step,	  Huntington	  explains	  that	  the	  civic	  expectations	  of	  the	  people	  have	  increased,	  allowing	  them	  to	  express	  what	  they	  want	  from	  the	  government.	  The	  economic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  In	  a	  simple	  idea,	  the	  ruling	  authoritarian	  government	  imitated	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  democratic	  structure	  by	  promising	  it	  within	  their	  regime.	  If	  we	  look	  at	  Syria,	  we	  can	  consider	  that	  Hafez’s	  proposed	  constitution	  highlighting	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Baath	  Party	  was	  the	  promise	  of	  change,	  although	  disguised	  to	  assure	  his	  position	  in	  power.	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  development	  step	  of	  the	  wave	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  bring	  out	  democratic	  development,	  however,	  I’ve	  understood	  that	  the	  relationship	  shared	  by	  the	  two	  isn’t	  necessarily	  economic	  growth	  transferring	  itself	  to	  a	  democracy,	  but	  rather	  the	  achievements	  of	  economic	  development	  in	  the	  state	  provides	  a	  basis	  to	  create	  a	  democracy.	  Huntington	  explains	  that	  as	  countries	  develop	  economically	  and	  become	  wealthier,	  their	  transition	  democracy	  becomes	  achievable.	  However,	  with	  the	  third	  wave,	  economic	  development	  wasn’t	  always	  the	  key	  to	  democratization.	  Huntington	  explains	  that	  in	  countries	  like	  Iraq	  and	  Iran,	  although	  wealthy,	  and	  sustainable	  in	  oil	  production,	  democratization	  was	  unsuccessful.	  While	  a	  strong	  economic	  basis	  serves	  as	  building	  block	  for	  democratization,	  countries	  with	  developing	  industrialization	  and	  blooming	  social	  structure	  became	  difficult	  for	  an	  authoritarian	  regime	  to	  control.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  economic	  development	  brought	  on	  by	  industrialization	  brought	  more	  external	  wealth	  and	  resources	  to	  the	  country,	  forcing	  the	  government	  to	  adapt	  to	  a	  functional	  devolving	  form	  of	  decision	  making	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  resources	  outside	  the	  state	  (59-­‐61,	  68).	  	   With	  that	  being	  said,	  Huntington	  also	  points	  out	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  in	  ties	  to	  economic	  development.	  Since	  the	  middle	  class	  population	  is	  normally	  the	  product	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  industrial	  expansion,	  these	  citizens,	  from	  my	  interpretation,	  find	  themselves	  in	  the	  balance	  between	  the	  poverty	  level	  citizens	  and	  the	  rich.	  Because	  of	  that,	  as	  Huntington	  clarifies,	  the	  increasing	  size	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  places	  them	  in	  a	  position	  where	  they	  are	  confident	  enough	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  electoral	  process.	  In	  this	  theory,	  the	  middle	  class	  is	  the	  average	  working	  American.	  So,	  as	  the	  amount	  of	  these	  average	  Americans	  increase,	  they	  begin	  to	  develop	  an	  identity	  in	  the	  
15	  	  democratic	  community.	  For	  instance,	  in	  Obama’s	  election	  for	  both	  terms,	  a	  good	  amount	  of	  voters	  where	  of	  the	  Latino	  and	  African	  American	  community.	  The	  ties	  between	  Obama’s	  promises	  to	  strengthen	  the	  middle	  class	  and	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  being	  of	  Latino	  or	  African	  American	  origin	  placed	  them	  in	  a	  trustful	  position	  with	  Obama	  because	  his	  agenda	  focused	  on	  plans	  that	  would	  help	  strengthen	  their	  community.	  However,	  while	  these	  correlations	  between	  economic	  development	  and	  democracy	  prove	  to	  be	  crucial	  to	  develop	  a	  basis	  for	  the	  path	  of	  democratization,	  a	  powerful	  economy	  serves	  a	  crucial	  purpose	  when	  it	  is	  associated	  with	  education	  (68-­‐69).	  As	  Huntington	  explains,	  economic	  development	  brought	  an	  increase	  in	  citizens	  attending	  secondary,	  therefore	  strengthening	  their	  trust	  to	  democratization.	  Because	  the	  citizen	  is	  increasingly	  educated,	  as	  well	  as	  satisfied	  with	  his	  own	  well-­‐being	  and	  the	  social	  structure	  of	  the	  state,	  willingness	  to	  accept	  democratization	  is	  welcomed9.	  	  The	  third	  step	  of	  the	  process	  is	  a	  change	  in	  religious	  institutions	  that	  make	  them	  opposing	  to	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  in	  place.	  In	  other	  words,	  I’ve	  deduced	  that	  this	  step	  calls	  for	  the	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state	  in	  the	  democratizing	  country.	  As	  Huntington	  explains,	  modern	  democracy	  was	  created	  by	  the	  vigorous	  attempts	  made	  by	  Catholicism	  and/or	  Protestantism	  to	  break	  the	  ties	  of	  church	  and	  state	  in	  repressive	  countries.	  From	  my	  own	  analysis,	  if	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  government	  intermix	  together,	  especially	  in	  an	  authoritarian	  regime,	  the	  end	  result	  is	  constant	  battle	  between	  other	  religious	  sects	  in	  the	  country	  and	  the	  government’s	  selected	  religious	  representation.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  this	  step	  in	  the	  wave	  explains	  the	  important	  characteristics	  that	  fall	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Huntington	  explains	  that	  if	  economic	  growth	  can	  occur	  without	  economic	  crisis,	  the	  democracy	  can	  begin	  to	  evolve	  slowly.	  In	  the	  long-­‐term,	  economic	  development	  creates	  the	  fundamental	  basis	  for	  a	  democratic	  regime	  to	  occur.	  	  
16	  	  separating	  church	  and	  state.	  In	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  Protestant	  Church,	  their	  agendas	  represented	  democratic	  leadership	  and	  did	  not	  allow	  any	  one	  sole	  power	  to	  a	  bishop	  while	  denying	  the	  congregation.	  The	  Protestant	  Church	  was	  represented	  as	  a	  democratically	  organized	  church.	  In	  contrast	  to	  that,	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  was	  set	  up	  with	  an	  authoritarian	  structure,	  with	  ranks	  that	  divided	  all	  participating	  figures	  of	  the	  church.	  So,	  the	  association	  between	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  and	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  was	  unchallengeable,	  until	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  (76-­‐77,	  80).	  	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  democratizing	  countries	  in	  the	  third	  wave	  during	  those	  years	  were	  predominantly	  Catholic.	  In	  summary,	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  the	  countries	  that	  transitioned	  to	  a	  democratic	  government	  in	  the	  mid	  1970s	  to	  the	  late	  1980s	  were	  Catholic	  countries.	  I’ve	  understood	  that	  the	  explanation	  behind	  this	  transition	  is	  the	  overflow	  of	  democratization	  in	  Protestant	  countries.	  Because	  it	  seemed	  that	  Protestant	  countries	  were	  democratized	  by	  selection,	  the	  remaining	  countries	  that	  were	  left	  were	  democratized	  by	  the	  wave	  would	  have	  to	  be	  Catholic	  countries.	  Historically,	  Catholic	  countries	  were	  known	  to	  be	  poor	  countries	  with	  little	  economic	  development.	  So,	  how	  does	  the	  historical	  authoritarian	  organizational	  structure	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  correlate	  with	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  democratized	  countries?	  Huntington	  explains	  that	  in	  the	  1950s,	  there	  was	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  organizational	  system	  that	  was	  built	  within	  the	  Catholic	  Church.	  Unlike	  the	  previous	  authoritarian	  divide,	  the	  Catholic	  Church’s	  transition	  into	  an	  opposing	  institution	  of	  dictatorial	  and	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  therefore	  redirecting	  Catholicism	  as	  a	  force	  for	  democracy,	  rather	  than	  an	  obstacle	  of	  democracy	  (82-­‐85).	  	  With	  the	  third	  step	  serving	  as	  a	  stride	  to	  separate	  church	  from	  state,	  the	  fourth	  steps	  of	  the	  wave	  introduces	  the	  necessity	  to	  promote	  human	  rights	  and	  democracy	  in	  a	  
17	  	  state	  by	  external	  participation.	  This	  step	  in	  Huntington’s	  framework	  explains	  the	  importance	  of	  external	  states	  or	  resources	  giving	  an	  extra	  push	  to	  newly	  transitioning	  democratic	  countries.	  While	  the	  internal	  transition	  from	  authoritarian	  to	  democratic	  can	  be	  built	  off	  the	  earlier	  steps	  in	  the	  framework,	  the	  participation	  of	  external	  democratized	  nations	  adds	  a	  monitor	  to	  the	  newly	  developed	  governments	  of	  these	  democratized	  states.	  Since	  these	  states	  have	  completely	  restricted	  their	  governmental	  framework,	  Huntington’s	  points	  about	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  promotion	  serve	  as	  a	  monitoring	  eye	  to	  these	  transitioning	  states.	  I	  believe	  that	  since	  there	  would	  most	  likely	  be	  an	  internal	  divide	  about	  the	  newly	  founded	  government,	  an	  external	  source,	  like	  the	  United	  States	  or	  the	  European	  Community,	  would	  serve	  as	  an	  adviser	  to	  how	  the	  human	  treatment	  and	  social	  structure	  would	  carry	  out	  in	  the	  country	  (86-­‐88).	  In	  any	  case,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  positions	  of	  these	  external	  resources	  would	  each	  play	  a	  different	  role.	  One	  position	  would	  be	  mediate	  relations	  and	  discussions	  between	  opposing	  sides	  of	  the	  country.	  Another	  position	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  monitor	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  upmost	  humanitarian	  treatment	  is	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  state.	  Another	  resource	  would	  play	  the	  role	  of	  influencer	  by	  continuing	  to	  promote	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  democracy	  in	  the	  transitioned	  state.	  In	  summary,	  these	  external	  forces	  would	  play	  a	  role	  that	  would	  influence	  and	  ensure	  that	  the	  newly	  democratized	  state	  would	  be	  able	  to	  maintain	  the	  transition,	  rather	  than	  fall	  back	  into	  a	  limbo10.	  The	  final	  step	  in	  the	  wave	  is	  the	  demonstration,	  or	  domino	  effect	  that	  a	  newly	  developed,	  successful	  democratized	  nation	  has	  on	  other	  countries.	  Demonstration	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  In	  a	  measure	  of	  U.S.	  impact	  on	  democratization,	  Huntington	  explains	  the	  complaints	  coming	  from	  dictators	  in	  South	  America	  and	  Asia	  about	  U.S.	  interference	  in	  their	  own	  domestic	  politics.	  In	  most	  cases,	  these	  complaints	  were	  justified	  (96).	  
18	  	  effects	  in	  the	  third	  wave	  of	  democratization	  differ	  than	  other	  waves	  because	  the	  expansion	  of	  global	  communications	  that	  the	  twentieth	  century	  has	  offered	  presents	  an	  expanded	  audience	  to	  world	  affairs.	  Because	  country	  leaders	  could	  not	  easily	  regulate	  what	  was	  seen,	  the	  1980s	  idea	  of	  “world	  democratic	  revolution”	  was	  a	  fearful	  reality	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  many	  political	  leaders	  across	  the	  world.	  This	  theoretical	  revolution	  posed	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  people	  of	  the	  world	  to	  connect	  themselves	  to	  political	  events	  and	  situations	  that	  were	  not	  near	  them,	  as	  well	  as	  tie	  their	  relevance	  and	  importance	  to	  these	  political	  events.	  Furthermore,	  the	  powerful	  importance	  of	  global	  communication	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  tie	  relevance	  all	  over	  the	  world	  was	  not	  the	  only	  step	  in	  strengthening	  the	  demonstration	  effect	  of	  the	  third	  wave.	  Decade-­‐standing	  authoritarian	  regimes	  were	  being	  conquered	  and	  torn	  down	  from	  the	  impacts	  of	  newly	  developed	  democratic	  states	  (101-­‐102).	  While	  some	  countries’	  democratizations	  served	  little	  meaning	  in	  the	  international	  community,	  other	  newly	  transitioned	  countries	  changed	  international	  relations,	  as	  we	  know	  them.	  However,	  as	  Huntington	  stresses,	  the	  demonstration	  effects	  were	  not	  always	  effective	  in	  early	  democratizations.	  Some	  of	  these	  democratized	  states	  were	  caused	  by	  the	  snowball	  effect.	  However,	  once	  these	  transitions	  were	  made,	  they	  began	  to	  impact	  the	  big	  leagues	  in	  the	  international	  community,	  influencing	  them	  to	  then	  make	  the	  transition	  themselves.	  When	  countries	  like	  Spain,	  Argentina	  and	  Portugal	  were	  democratized,	  they	  opened	  doors	  for	  other	  struggling	  countries	  to	  break	  free	  from	  the	  iron	  grip	  of	  their	  withstanding	  authoritarian	  regime	  and	  take	  the	  path	  to	  create	  a	  democratic	  state	  of	  their	  own11.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Huntington	  explains	  the	  element	  of	  “why	  not	  us?”	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Korea	  and	  East	  Germans.	  In	  my	  own	  perspective,	  from	  my	  research,	  I	  think	  it’s	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  Syrians	  asked	  themselves	  the	  same	  questions	  when	  the	  pro-­‐democracy	  protests	  began	  (105).	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Overthrowing	  and	  Democratization	  How	  does	  Huntington’s	  framework	  mechanisms	  apply	  to	  Syria?	  To	  begin	  with	  a	  simple	  fact,	  a	  97%	  approval	  rating	  by	  the	  public	  with	  a	  father	  whose	  massacre	  of	  the	  country	  murdered	  more	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  people	  is	  skeptical.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  Baath	  party	  has	  been	  in	  place	  since	  the	  late	  1940s.	  Although	  Bashar	  promised	  to	  enter	  power	  with	  a	  plan	  of	  more	  modern	  freedom	  for	  the	  Syrian	  people,	  we	  saw	  that	  his	  promise	  wasn’t	  carried	  out12.	  Huntington	  explains	  that	  nondemocratic	  regimes	  and	  one-­‐party	  systems	  approach	  an	  opposition	  by	  identifying	  another	  party	  in	  the	  state.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Syria,	  the	  Baath	  Party’s	  new	  role	  as	  a	  leadership	  framework	  for	  the	  country	  seemed	  to	  deter	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  authoritarian	  regime	  taking	  place	  under	  the—clearly	  false—idea	  of	  a	  democracy.	  After	  Hafez	  died,	  the	  Syrian	  parliament	  amended	  the	  constitution	  to	  lower	  the	  minimum	  age	  requirement	  for	  presidency	  to	  allow	  Bashar	  to	  take	  hold	  of	  the	  country.	  The	  Baath	  Party	  unanimously	  elected	  him	  as	  leader,	  with	  no	  elections	  or	  public	  opinion	  in	  the	  process.	  The	  only	  clear	  amendment	  to	  the	  constitution	  at	  this	  time	  was	  lowering	  the	  age	  requirement	  from	  forty	  to	  thirty-­‐four.	  This	  amendment,	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  is	  the	  first	  flag	  to	  show	  the	  oppression	  in	  Syria.	  Not	  only	  did	  Hafez’s	  proposal	  of	  the	  original	  constitution	  secure	  his	  place	  in	  power,	  but	  the	  amendment	  made	  for	  Bashar	  will	  secure	  his	  position	  in	  power	  for	  at	  least	  another	  decade,	  just	  because	  of	  the	  constitutional	  powers	  he	  has	  as	  president	  (Fares).	  How	  can	  we	  legitimize	  the	  Assad	  regime	  without	  using	  the	  point	  of	  it	  being	  a	  forced	  government	  on	  the	  public?	  In	  his	  book,	  Huntington	  has	  created	  a	  guideline	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Assad	  insisted	  that	  Syria	  was	  immune	  from	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  that	  started	  in	  2011.	  When	  he	  entered	  Syria	  as	  the	  new	  president,	  he	  took	  initiative	  to	  free	  political	  prisoners,	  but	  failed	  to	  change	  powers	  that	  denied	  citizens’	  rights	  to	  form	  associations	  and	  political	  parties	  that	  would	  express	  their	  opinions	  (Profile:	  Bashar	  Al-­‐Assad,	  Al-­‐Jazeera).	  
20	  	  overthrowing	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  The	  first	  step	  of	  the	  guideline	  is	  to	  focus	  the	  attention	  on	  the	  illegitimacy	  of	  the	  regime,	  with	  extra	  attention	  to	  how	  it’s	  failing	  and	  its	  vulnerable	  points.	  Before	  I	  dive	  into	  the	  brutality	  of	  the	  regime,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  overflow	  of	  refugee	  in	  neighboring	  countries,	  I	  want	  to	  discuss	  one	  of	  the	  key	  building	  blocks	  to	  building	  a	  stable	  and	  strongly-­‐developed	  country	  and	  government:	  economy.	  Before	  the	  war,	  the	  unemployment	  rate	  of	  Syria	  was	  10%,	  and	  they	  had	  more	  than	  $2	  billion	  in	  exports	  and	  commodities	  (Deutsche	  Welle).	  Oil	  revenue	  played	  a	  big	  role	  in	  the	  overall	  government	  revenue,	  bringing	  in	  more	  than	  150	  billion	  Syrian	  lira	  in	  2010.	  After	  the	  bloodshed	  of	  the	  war,	  the	  unemployment	  rate	  has	  skyrocketed	  to	  50%,	  making	  about	  every	  other	  Syrian	  unemployed.	  A	  report	  issued	  by	  the	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Commission	  for	  Western	  Asia	  showed	  that	  the	  transportation	  sector	  in	  Syria	  fell	  from	  190	  billion	  SYP	  to	  about	  12	  billion	  SYP	  from	  2010	  to	  2012.	  Continuous	  sanctions	  against	  human	  rights	  violations	  put	  in	  place	  by	  the	  European	  Union	  have	  severely	  participated	  in	  the	  crash	  and	  burn	  of	  this	  economy.	  	  I	  was	  recently	  able	  to	  interview	  a	  Syrian	  refugee	  who	  came	  to	  the	  United	  States	  about	  the	  living	  and	  employment	  conditions	  in	  Syria.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  my	  research	  and	  her	  safety,	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  her	  as	  Layla.	  She	  explained	  to	  me	  how	  water,	  electricity,	  Internet,	  and	  heat	  would	  be	  cut	  off	  at	  random	  times	  in	  rebel-­‐lead	  areas.	  She	  said	  that	  these	  outages	  came	  unexpectedly	  and	  would	  last	  for	  different	  periods	  of	  time.	  Abu	  Ibrahim	  Al-­‐Raqqawi,	  who	  is	  co-­‐founder	  for	  a	  widely	  known	  Syrian	  activist	  group,	  Raqqa	  Is	  Being	  Slaughtered	  Silently,	  told	  me	  that	  after	  the	  civil	  war	  began,	  electricity	  and	  water	  would	  cut-­‐offs	  would	  be	  isolated	  to	  areas	  that	  were	  more	  populated	  with	  rebels.	  
21	  	  The	  areas	  that	  were	  known	  to	  have	  greater	  support	  for	  the	  regime	  would	  have	  electricity	  and	  water	  for	  longer	  parts	  of	  the	  day.13	  But	  in	  the	  case	  of	  economic	  stability	  for	  the	  regime	  and	  Assad	  supporters,	  they	  had	  a	  helping	  hand.	  As	  ISIS	  continues	  to	  seize	  oil	  fields,	  they	  sold	  back	  the	  regimes	  oil	  to	  them	  at	  cheap	  rates,	  helping	  boost	  their	  financial	  slips.	  Abu	  Ibrahim	  explained	  to	  me	  that	  after	  ISIS	  seized	  eastern	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  regime	  supporters	  were	  forced	  to	  turn	  to	  them	  for	  resources.	  “It	  was	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  regime	  to	  cooperate	  with	  ISIS	  for	  these	  resources,”	  he	  said.	  “ISIS	  would	  say	  ‘I	  will	  give	  you	  [x]	  amount	  of	  hours	  of	  electricity,	  in	  exchange,	  you	  bring	  someone	  to	  help	  fix	  the	  power	  lines	  or	  we	  will	  not	  help	  you,’	  so	  it	  was	  beneficial	  for	  the	  regime	  to	  cooperate.”	  	  Economy	  is	  one	  solid	  point	  that	  I	  wanted	  to	  discuss	  in	  regards	  to	  Huntington’s	  guideline	  to	  overthrowing	  a	  regime.	  As	  I	  previously	  said,	  he	  explains	  that	  a	  key	  to	  confronting	  the	  regime	  is	  to	  attack	  the	  corruption	  and	  brutality	  it	  shows.	  In	  2013,	  the	  regime	  threw	  chemical	  attacks	  on	  neighborhoods,	  killing	  more	  than	  1,000	  citizens.	  Videos	  swarmed	  the	  Internet,	  and	  the	  U.N.	  was	  demanded	  at	  the	  sight	  to	  determine	  what	  happened	  and	  who	  was	  behind	  it.	  U.N.	  inspectors	  confirmed	  that	  sarin	  gas	  was	  used,	  and	  U.N.	  Secretary	  General	  Ban	  Ki-­‐Moon	  said	  that	  this	  was	  the	  largest	  case	  of	  chemical	  weapon	  use	  since	  the	  1988	  attacks	  by	  Saddam	  Hussein	  in	  Haljaba14.	  Huntington’s	  point	  about	  attacking	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  authoritarian	  government	  is	  one	  of	  the	  easier	  steps	  when	  discussing	  the	  Assad	  regime.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  advancement	  of	  technology	  past	  borders	  and	  oceans,	  the	  world	  has	  been	  able	  to	  get	  an	  inside	  look	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  I	  was	  able	  to	  speak	  to	  Abu	  Ibrahim	  several	  times	  about	  his	  experiences	  in	  Raqqa,	  which	  is	  now	  controlled	  by	  ISIS.	  14	  An	  article	  released	  by	  BBC	  gave	  all	  the	  facts	  to	  what	  the	  UN	  found	  in	  their	  investigations	  after	  the	  chemical	  weapon	  attack.	  They	  confirmed	  that	  sarin	  was	  the	  agent	  used	  in	  Damascus	  on	  August	  21st.	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  what	  is	  happening	  in	  Syria	  secondhand	  to	  what	  the	  citizens	  are	  going	  through.	  I	  think	  the	  outrage	  of	  the	  crimes	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  movement	  being	  made	  by	  the	  government	  as	  well	  as	  international	  allies	  is	  what	  is	  most	  surprising	  about	  the	  tragedy.	  	  Iran,	  China	  and	  Russia	  have	  already	  confirmed	  their	  alliance,	  and	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  being	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  U.N.	  Security	  Council,	  they’ve	  already	  secured	  their	  promise	  to	  Assad	  to	  make	  all	  efforts	  to	  veto	  and	  throw	  off	  any	  attempts	  made	  by	  the	  council	  that	  may	  potentially	  threaten	  his	  position.	  	  However,	  although	  the	  points	  of	  economy	  and	  chemical	  attacks	  are	  illegitimate	  and	  dubious,	  it	  doesn’t	  make	  a	  difference	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  solidity	  of	  the	  regime.	  With	  allies	  like	  Russia	  and	  Iran,	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  for	  Assad	  to	  be	  removed	  from	  power.	  Not	  only	  this,	  but	  the	  role	  of	  ISIS	  in	  Syria	  has	  deterred	  the	  path	  of	  overthrowing	  Assad	  and	  reconstructed	  itself	  into	  a	  path	  that	  will	  defeat	  ISIS.	  So,	  in	  a	  sense,	  yes,	  this	  step	  of	  Huntington’s	  framework	  is	  applicable	  to	  Syria.	  We	  see	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  failing	  and	  the	  citizens	  are	  suffering	  from	  the	  brutality	  of	  the	  violence.	  However,	  ISIS’	  position	  inside	  the	  country,	  and	  their	  financial	  exchanges	  with	  the	  regime	  put	  this	  step	  at	  a	  difficult	  position	  for	  action.	  While	  the	  situation	  in	  Syria	  meets	  the	  criteria	  for	  this	  step,	  ISIS’	  presence	  distracts	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  framework.	  	  The	  second	  step	  of	  Huntington’s	  democratization	  guideline	  explains	  the	  efforts	  made	  by	  authoritarian	  leaders	  to	  recruit	  high-­‐class	  officials	  that	  help	  legitimize	  the	  regime,	  making	  it	  look	  more	  respectable	  and	  responsible.	  Abu	  Ibrahim	  explained	  to	  me	  that	  all	  the	  supporters	  of	  the	  regime	  where	  in	  close	  contact	  with	  Assad	  government.	  He	  tells	  me	  that	  it	  was	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  high-­‐class	  supporters	  that	  Assad	  stays	  in	  power	  so	  that	  they	  can	  stay	  protected	  and	  have	  money.	  As	  Huntington	  explained,	  many	  
23	  	  of	  these	  enlisted	  leaders	  were	  original	  supporters	  of	  the	  authoritarian	  system	  in	  its	  beginning	  stages	  (150).	  As	  Abu	  Ibrahim	  told	  me,	  those	  who	  were	  in	  support	  of	  the	  regime	  were	  taken	  care	  of	  by	  Assad,	  and	  were	  promised	  luxury	  as	  long	  as	  they	  pledged	  an	  allegiance	  to	  him.	  	  	   In	  terms	  of	  citizen	  support,	  he	  explained	  to	  me	  that	  the	  same	  network	  promises	  were	  offered.	  Although	  they	  were	  not	  promised	  the	  luxury	  of	  the	  high-­‐class	  leaders,	  the	  Alawite	  citizens	  of	  Syria	  maintained	  their	  allegiance	  for	  social	  safety	  and	  benefit.	  “It	  was	  helpful	  to	  them,	  and	  in	  their	  best	  interest,	  to	  stay	  with	  Assad,”	  said	  Abu	  Ibrahim.	  “They	  know	  that	  if	  Assad	  is	  removed,	  they	  have	  no	  hope	  in	  the	  country.”	  And	  what	  he	  says	  is	  true.	  	  A	  BBC	  analysis	  of	  the	  Alawite’s	  in	  Syria	  explained	  that	  many	  of	  them	  Alawites	  believe	  that	  all	  that	  stands	  between	  them	  and	  a	  return	  to	  a	  second-­‐class	  status,	  or	  even	  death,	  is	  Assad15.	  Along	  with	  that,	  Abu	  Ibrahim	  told	  me	  that	  the	  people	  controlling	  jobs	  in	  the	  community,	  like	  teachers	  or	  businesses,	  were	  Alawites,	  because	  Assad	  was	  sure	  of	  their	  commitment.	  If	  they	  were	  able	  to	  control	  what’s	  left	  of	  a	  basic	  functioning	  society,	  then	  he	  could	  be	  sure	  that	  regular	  citizens	  were	  able	  to	  keep	  the	  reigns	  of	  the	  Alawite	  allegiance	  in	  the	  community.	  Huntington	  explains	  that	  authoritarian	  leaders	  enlist	  high-­‐class	  figures	  to	  keep	  their	  position	  strong,	  especially	  if	  these	  figures	  are	  well	  liked.	  While	  I	  can’t	  confirm	  the	  likeness	  of	  his	  house	  and	  cabinet	  members,	  I	  can	  say	  that	  his	  promise	  to	  middle	  and	  lower	  class	  citizens	  is	  what	  helps	  keep	  his	  regime	  strong	  today.	  Abu	  Ibrahim	  told	  me	  that	  all	  of	  his	  supporters	  are	  getting	  the	  rare	  jobs	  and	  are	  getting	  an	  education.	  “They	  have	  a	  role	  in	  the	  community,”	  he	  said,	  “because	  he	  knows	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  The	  documentary	  explained	  how	  the	  Alawite	  sect	  was	  under	  threat.	  Abu	  Ibrahim	  explained	  to	  me	  that	  they	  knew	  if	  Assad	  was	  removed	  from	  his	  seat,	  they	  would	  die	  or	  be	  run	  out	  of	  the	  country.	  He	  explained	  that	  they	  have	  no	  hope	  without	  him.	  
24	  	  they’ll	  keep	  his	  order	  running.”	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  anti-­‐regime	  supporters	  or	  citizens	  associated	  with	  the	  rebels	  and	  Free	  Syrian	  Army,	  he	  told	  me	  they	  have	  no	  place.	  “They	  are	  at	  the	  bottom,”	  he	  explained.	  “If	  a	  regime	  supporter	  didn’t	  have	  a	  degree,	  but	  a	  revolution	  supporter	  did,	  the	  regime	  supporter	  would	  get	  the	  job,	  and	  the	  revolution	  supporter	  would	  have	  nothing.”	  	  	   This	  step	  in	  the	  framework	  to	  overthrow	  regimes	  is	  difficult	  to	  apply	  to	  Syria.	  We	  know	  how	  negatively	  the	  regime	  is	  impacting	  order	  in	  Syria.	  However,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  the	  support	  from	  the	  citizens	  in	  the	  community	  is	  playing	  a	  bigger	  role	  in	  deterring	  the	  process	  of	  overthrowing	  the	  regime.	  Along	  with	  that,	  Assad	  has	  the	  full	  support	  of	  Hezbollah	  and	  Iran.	  Iran’s	  role	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  their	  conflicting	  relationship	  with	  the	  U.S.	  puts	  them	  at	  a	  very	  powerful	  position	  with	  Syria.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  after	  examining	  the	  topic,	  it	  would	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  apply	  this	  step	  to	  democratizing	  Syria.	  Iran	  is	  a	  figurehead	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  and	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  coming	  head-­‐to-­‐head	  with	  Syria	  on	  this	  step	  would	  be	  reasonable.	  	  	   The	  third	  step	  of	  overthrowing	  an	  authoritarian	  regime,	  Huntington	  explains	  the	  importance	  of	  generals.	  The	  last	  analysis	  explained	  how	  having	  these	  leading	  figureheads	  on	  your	  side	  will	  play	  a	  role	  in	  how	  the	  crisis	  evolves16.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Syria,	  the	  Free	  Syrian	  Army	  is	  made	  up	  of	  rebels	  opposing	  the	  regime.	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  is	  that	  they	  are	  not	  a	  unified	  organization.	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  rapidly	  changing	  and	  deteriorating	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  rebels,	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  find	  convincing	  evidence	  to	  prove	  my	  point	  of	  their	  disconnections.	  However,	  Dr.	  Najib	  Ghadbian,	  a	  Political	  Science	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Huntington	  explains	  how	  military	  assistance	  is	  beneficial	  when	  the	  crisis	  comes.	  He	  also	  explains	  how	  these	  figureheads	  decide	  whether	  the	  regime	  collapses	  by	  standing	  next	  to	  it	  in	  support,	  or	  on	  the	  sidelines	  (150).	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  professor	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Arkansas,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Special	  Representative	  to	  the	  United	  States	  for	  the	  National	  Coalition	  of	  Syrian	  Revolution	  and	  Opposition	  forces	  sat	  down	  with	  me	  to	  explain	  on	  a	  deeper	  level	  why	  this	  step	  might	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  the	  framework.	  	   He	  explained	  that	  the	  regime	  was	  a	  centralized	  organization,	  which	  was	  able	  to	  tie	  back	  to	  the	  government.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  rebels,	  they	  existed	  in	  their	  own	  areas	  as	  independent	  groups.	  “The	  Free	  Syrian	  Army	  of	  Aleppo	  is	  the	  Free	  Syrian	  Army	  of	  Aleppo,	  and	  the	  Free	  Syrian	  Army	  of	  Daraa’	  is	  the	  Free	  Syrian	  Army	  of	  Daraa’,”	  he	  said.	  Dr.	  Ghadbian	  explained	  that	  their	  decentralization	  and	  inability	  to	  have	  a	  unified	  relationship	  is	  what	  limited	  their	  power	  in	  the	  war.	  As	  ISIS	  and	  the	  regime	  were	  able	  to	  have	  a	  centralized	  network,	  the	  rebels	  were	  working	  off	  the	  whim	  of	  what	  was	  available.	  They	  were	  all	  for	  the	  same	  cause,	  they	  were	  localized.	  They	  are	  not	  the	  entire	  Free	  Syrian	  Army	  as	  a	  whole.	  	   Huntington	  says	  that	  you	  need	  military	  unwillingness	  to	  defend	  the	  regime,	  as	  well	  as	  cultivate	  generals	  to	  support	  overthrowing	  the	  regime	  (150).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Syria,	  Huntington’s	  framework	  needs	  to	  be	  altered.	  I	  have	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  revolution	  can	  cultivate	  general	  to	  support	  overthrowing	  Assad.	  What	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  is	  not	  only	  their	  decentralization,	  but	  the	  limited	  access	  there	  is	  to	  the	  country.	  Along	  with	  that,	  ISIS’	  presence	  on	  the	  Eastern	  side,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  collaborations	  with	  the	  regime	  to	  infiltrate	  themselves	  into	  regime-­‐controlled	  areas,	  puts	  any	  type	  of	  cultivation	  or	  democratic	  support	  on	  hold.	  There	  is	  no	  room	  for	  anyone	  to	  come	  in	  and	  help	  Syria.	  While	  Huntington’s	  framework	  is	  the	  most	  reasonable,	  as	  well	  as	  most	  applicable	  to	  what	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  defend,	  his	  guideline	  for	  democratization	  does	  not	  consider	  the	  
26	  	  mechanisms	  of	  a	  civil	  war-­‐torn	  country	  with	  the	  control	  of	  a	  terrorist	  organization.	  This	  step	  of	  the	  guideline	  fails	  to	  analyze	  the	  limited	  access,	  limited	  resources,	  and	  limited	  support	  there	  is	  for	  the	  democracy	  supporters.	  Huntington	  says	  to	  cultivate	  generals	  that	  would	  stand	  by	  the	  movement;	  in	  this	  case,	  who	  would	  stand	  by	  the	  rebels?	  The	  United	  States	  has	  shifted	  agendas	  from	  removing	  Assad	  to	  dismantling	  the	  Islamic	  State.	  If	  we	  look	  to	  surrounding	  nations	  for	  support,	  it’s	  very	  minor	  and	  limited.	  We	  have	  Iran	  providing	  weapons,	  political	  support,	  as	  well	  as	  Hezbollah	  as	  a	  resource	  for	  the	  regime	  fighters.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  countries	  like	  Saudi	  Arabia	  or	  Turkey	  or	  Qatar	  are	  in	  support	  of	  the	  revolution,	  but	  they	  give	  a	  little	  here	  and	  a	  little	  there.	  The	  amounts	  don’t	  match	  up	  to	  the	  regime17.	  In	  the	  fourth	  step,	  Huntington	  explains	  the	  importance	  of	  preaching	  nonviolence	  to	  help	  overthrow.	  A	  unique	  aspect	  of	  Bashar’s	  presidency	  is	  that	  he	  promised	  to	  push	  a	  more	  modern	  and	  free	  way	  of	  thinking	  during	  his	  presidency.	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  National	  Public	  Radio,	  David	  Lesch,	  a	  professor	  at	  Trinity	  University,	  explained	  his	  encounters	  with	  Assad.	  Lesch	  explained	  that	  as	  Bashar	  entered	  the	  presidency,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  he	  wanted	  to	  establish	  change	  in	  the	  country,	  and	  make	  efforts	  to	  remove	  the	  authoritarian	  regime.	  But	  instead	  of	  Bashar	  gripping	  the	  system,	  the	  system	  gripped	  him.	  “What	  I	  think	  ended	  up	  happening	  is	  the	  authoritarian	  system	  changed	  him,”	  said	  Lesch.	  The	  unique	  part	  of	  this	  situation	  is	  that	  Lesch’s	  second	  book,	  Syria,	  the	  Fall	  of	  the	  
House	  of	  Assad,	  hints	  that	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Assad	  regime	  has	  its	  end,	  and	  Lesch	  doesn’t	  deny	  that.	  He	  explains	  that	  the	  regime	  sees	  this	  battle	  as	  a	  10-­‐15	  year	  path	  from	  when	  it	  started,	  and	  from	  that	  point	  the	  opposition	  will	  deteriorate	  and	  people	  will	  conform.	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Dr.	  Ghadbian	  explained	  these	  countries’	  limited	  offerings	  when	  it	  came	  to	  helping	  the	  rebels.	  
27	  	  an	  article	  Lesch	  wrote	  for	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  Lesch	  explained	  how	  Assad	  was	  not	  Moammar	  Ghaddafi,	  and	  that	  Syria	  was	  not	  Libya.	  He	  explained	  how	  the	  brutality	  on	  the	  people	  was	  not	  necessarily	  a	  regime	  action,	  but	  maybe	  action	  taken	  by	  the	  police	  after	  too	  many	  years	  of	  being	  laid	  back	  with	  the	  public.18	  This	  step	  in	  the	  guideline	  advises	  to	  practice	  and	  preach	  nonviolence.	  This	  way,	  the	  pro-­‐democracy	  group	  can	  win	  over	  security	  forces	  because	  they	  are	  not	  resorting	  to	  violence	  as	  a	  means	  of	  attention	  (150).	  To	  apply	  this	  concept	  to	  Syria,	  we	  would	  have	  to	  re-­‐establish	  the	  role	  of	  rebels	  in	  the	  civil	  war.	  Although,	  in	  my	  opinion	  and	  from	  my	  analysis,	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  pro-­‐democracy	  protests	  were	  peaceful,	  I	  will	  reproach	  this	  thought	  according	  to	  the	  current	  situation.	  Huntington	  says	  to	  practice	  what	  you	  preach.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  rebels	  are	  contradicting	  their	  purpose	  of	  a	  free	  Syria.	  If	  they	  are	  fighting	  for	  a	  democracy,	  why	  should	  there	  be	  bloodshed?	  Instead,	  the	  rebels	  need	  to	  step	  away	  from	  the	  violence	  and	  resort	  to	  a	  peaceful	  resolution	  to	  call	  for	  a	  transition	  in	  government.	  Now,	  I’m	  not	  in	  full	  agreement	  with	  my	  statement.	  While	  Huntington	  makes	  a	  good	  point	  about	  practicing	  nonviolence	  as	  a	  means	  of	  communication,	  I	  don’t	  believe	  there	  is	  any	  hope	  of	  peaceful	  communication	  between	  the	  opposition	  and	  the	  rebels	  at	  this	  point.	  After	  more	  than	  four	  years	  of	  bloodshed,	  how	  will	  trust	  be	  established	  between	  security	  forces	  and	  the	  rebels,	  the	  rebels	  and	  the	  opposition,	  and	  ISIS	  with	  all	  three?	  It	  cannot	  exist.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  start	  back	  in	  2011,	  and	  present	  the	  rebels	  as	  a	  group	  of	  peaceful,	  democracy-­‐seeking	  citizens,	  who	  hoped	  to	  establish	  a	  means	  of	  fairness	  in	  the	  government,	  then	  this	  would	  have	  worked	  out	  in	  some	  way	  or	  another.	  But	  after	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Lesch	  explained	  how	  the	  uprisings	  in	  Syria	  gave	  Bashar	  a	  chance	  to	  become	  something	  beside	  Hafez	  Al-­‐Assad’s	  son.	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  four	  years	  of	  crime	  and	  explosions,	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  ‘peaceful’	  aspect	  exists	  in	  Syria.	  Huntington	  is	  right;	  we	  should	  preach	  nonviolence	  and	  peaceful	  cooperation.	  But	  now,	  who	  will	  preach	  that	  loud	  enough	  and	  peacefully	  enough	  for	  the	  government	  to	  pay	  attention?	  Even	  more,	  who	  will	  listen	  to	  them	  if	  they	  do?	  	  The	  fifth	  guideline	  is	  something	  I	  touched	  on	  when	  discussing	  elections	  in	  Syria.	  It	  discusses	  overthrowing	  an	  authoritarian	  regime	  by	  seizing	  every	  opportunity	  to	  express	  opposition	  towards	  the	  regime,	  including	  election	  periods.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Syria,	  expressing	  opposition	  to	  Assad’s	  rule	  was	  limited	  to	  every	  seven	  years.	  In	  the	  most	  recent	  elections	  last	  year,	  Bashar	  Al-­‐Assad	  won,	  signing	  him	  up	  for	  another	  seven-­‐year	  term	  as	  president.	  However,	  the	  constitution	  allows	  the	  person	  to	  renew	  their	  term	  only	  once.	  As	  of	  now,	  no	  coincidental	  efforts	  to	  amend	  the	  constitution	  have	  been	  made,	  but	  that	  will	  probably	  change	  in	  years	  to	  come.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Syria,	  we	  have	  seen	  how	  far	  they	  go	  to	  express	  their	  opinion	  about	  the	  opposition.	  Bashar’s	  respective	  88.7%	  majority	  win	  after	  holding	  elections	  in	  government-­‐controlled	  areas	  and	  excluding	  areas	  that	  are	  in	  rebel	  hands19.	  The	  next	  opportunity	  presented	  to	  the	  Syrians	  to	  exercise	  Huntington’s	  guideline	  will	  be	  in	  2012.	  	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  sixth	  and	  seventh	  guidelines,	  I	  believe	  that	  these	  can	  actually	  apply	  to	  Syria’s	  condition	  right	  now.	  While	  most	  of	  Huntington’s	  points	  in	  this	  guideline	  are	  realistic	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  overthrowing	  a	  regime,	  I	  think	  they	  failed	  to	  capture	  the	  unexpected	  arrival	  of	  ISIS	  during	  the	  civil	  war.	  While	  ISIS	  does	  not	  have	  a	  direct	  hand	  in	  overthrowing	  the	  government,	  their	  presence	  creates	  an	  obstacle	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  seizing	  the	  country	  away	  from	  Assad.	  This	  is	  why	  I	  believe	  these	  next	  two	  guidelines	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  The	  opposition,	  along	  with	  western	  allies,	  all	  denounced	  the	  election,	  despite	  a	  promise	  made	  by	  a	  delegation	  that	  promise	  transparent	  and	  free	  elections	  (The	  Guardian).	  
29	  	  help	  establish	  a	  mechanism	  that	  can	  be	  used	  by	  Syrians	  today	  as	  practice	  for	  what	  is	  to	  come.	   The	  sixth	  guideline	  encourages	  pro-­‐democracy	  seekers	  to	  develop	  contacts	  with	  the	  global	  media	  and	  expand	  their	  networks	  beyond	  their	  state	  borders.	  By	  this,	  Huntington	  suggests	  that	  mobilizing	  supporters	  in	  the	  United	  States	  will	  benefit	  the	  revolution.	  He	  says	  that	  American	  congress	  members	  are	  looking	  for	  good	  causes	  to	  support	  in	  return	  for	  positive	  publicity	  (150).	  While	  this	  is	  unfortunately	  true,	  it	  can	  only	  benefit	  the	  opposition	  against	  the	  regime.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Syria,	  we’ve	  seen	  how	  social	  media	  has	  helped	  expand	  their	  voice	  beyond	  the	  borders.	  Syrian	  activist	  Twitter	  accounts,	  Facebook	  pages,	  and	  blogs	  have	  been	  set	  up	  to	  give	  the	  world	  a	  live	  view	  as	  to	  what	  is	  going	  on	  inside	  the	  country.	  Children	  dead	  on	  the	  street,	  foaming	  at	  the	  mouth,	  malnourished	  and	  nude	  outraged	  the	  world	  and	  pointed	  fingers	  at	  America	  for	  staying	  silent.	  This	  tactic	  was	  used	  before	  I	  applied	  this	  guideline.	  Not	  only	  does	  this	  show	  us	  how	  unique	  democratic	  elements	  can	  be	  in	  an	  authoritarian	  country,	  but	  we	  also	  saw	  how	  fast	  this	  global	  hand	  extended	  and	  the	  result	  of	  it.	  In	  a	  country	  like	  Syria,	  where	  you’ve	  been	  denied	  your	  freedoms,	  immediate	  exposure	  is	  the	  only	  solution20.	  What’s	  even	  more	  unique	  is	  that	  many	  times,	  this	  media	  outreach	  would	  not	  always	  shed	  a	  bloody	  light	  on	  the	  country.	  In	  cases	  like	  the	  murder	  of	  teenager	  Michael	  Brown,	  we	  saw	  Syrians	  come	  together	  in	  silent	  support	  of	  protecting	  black	  lives	  in	  America.	  They	  held	  a	  sign	  with	  a	  message	  of	  sympathy.	  Rather	  than	  shed	  the	  light	  on	  themselves	  in	  a	  negative	  way,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  show	  their	  unity	  as	  citizens	  in	  a	  war-­‐torn	  country.	  Not	  only	  is	  this	  incredibly	  smart,	  but	  I	  think	  it	  goes	  above	  and	  beyond	  what	  Huntington	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Huntington	  says	  that	  you	  should	  dramatize	  your	  cause	  to	  them	  and	  give	  them	  a	  chance	  for	  TV	  opportunities	  and	  speeches	  (105).	  
30	  	  meant	  in	  the	  sixth	  guideline.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  any	  regime,	  it’s	  important	  for	  citizens	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  the	  world	  for	  attention	  and	  help.	  However,	  if	  these	  nations	  can	  represent	  solidarity	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  rather	  than	  ask	  for	  sympathy	  and	  help,	  it	  gives	  them	  a	  stronger	  picture	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  international	  society.	  The	  Syrians	  of	  Kafarnbel	  showed	  unity	  with	  Ferguson	  in	  that	  photo;	  not	  sympathy	  for	  Syria.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  element	  of	  the	  sixth	  guideline	  moves	  me	  on	  to	  the	  seventh:	  promoting	  unity	  among	  opposition	  groups.	  Huntington	  tells	  the	  reader	  that	  in	  order	  to	  test	  your	  democratic	  qualifications,	  you	  must	  prove	  your	  country’s	  ability	  to	  overcome	  opposition	  disunity.	  In	  truth,	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  if	  this	  guideline	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  regime.	  At	  one	  point,	  I	  do	  know	  that	  rebels	  and	  supporters	  were	  neighbors	  and	  coworkers	  and	  friends.	  Once	  the	  opposition	  broke	  out,	  it	  was	  clear	  who	  was	  taking	  which	  side.	  However,	  I	  believe	  there	  is	  hope.	  In	  a	  hypothetical	  scenario,	  let’s	  assume	  that	  pro-­‐democratic	  citizen	  came	  together	  to	  propose	  unity	  between	  the	  rebels	  and	  the	  regime,	  in	  such	  a	  case	  where	  they	  could	  come	  together	  to	  overthrow	  Assad	  and	  rebuild	  the	  nation	  under	  new	  terms.	  If	  we	  assume	  this	  hypothetical	  scenario	  were	  to	  happen,	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  unity	  between	  both	  sides	  would	  be	  strong	  enough	  to	  defeat	  ISIS.	  Right	  now,	  the	  undercover	  relationship	  between	  the	  regime	  and	  ISIS	  is	  like	  a	  ‘marriage	  of	  convenience,’	  which	  means	  that	  once	  one	  side	  is	  ready	  to	  let	  go,	  it	  has	  no	  value.	  If	  a	  pro-­‐democratic	  Syrian	  were	  to	  tackle	  the	  issue	  of	  unity,	  I	  think	  that	  this	  would	  ideally	  be	  the	  first	  step	  in	  overthrowing	  the	  Syrian	  government.	  While	  the	  first	  guideline	  was	  reasonable,	  it	  was	  not	  tailored	  enough	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  specific	  dilemma	  consuming	  Syria.	  One	  of	  the	  biggest	  problems	  now	  is	  disunity	  in	  the	  country.	  If	  a	  group	  can	  come	  together	  to	  bring	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  war	  and	  create	  an	  alliance	  between	  them,	  that	  unity	  would	  be	  
31	  	  enough	  to	  dismantle	  the	  Assad	  regime.	  At	  that	  point,	  the	  regime	  would	  have	  no	  fighters,	  and	  the	  rebels	  would	  not	  be	  on	  the	  losing	  side	  of	  the	  war21.	  As	  we	  conclude	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  finalize	  the	  guideline	  with	  the	  eighth	  and	  most	  important	  step:	  filling	  the	  empty	  seat	  of	  the	  regime	  a	  democratic	  one.	  When	  the	  Assad	  regime	  falls,	  a	  coalition	  of	  supervising	  nations	  must	  help	  the	  Syrians	  come	  together	  to	  replace	  the	  regime	  with	  a	  democratic	  government.	  It	  is	  crucial	  for	  the	  Syrians	  to	  be	  smart	  in	  the	  process	  of	  electing	  a	  new	  leader.	  I	  believe	  that	  even	  before	  the	  regime	  is	  overthrown,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  drafted	  plan	  in	  place.	  If	  Assad	  falls,	  Syria	  will	  be	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  ISIS.	  The	  Islamic	  State	  has	  continuously	  announced	  their	  plan	  to	  spread	  their	  caliphate	  into	  the	  Middle	  East	  to	  create	  one	  large	  nation	  under	  Islam.	  If	  they	  find	  time	  between	  Assad’s	  fall	  and	  a	  new	  leader,	  they	  might	  see	  the	  empty	  chair	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  take	  political	  control	  of	  the	  country.	  It	  is	  absolutely	  crucial	  that	  this	  does	  not	  happen.	  For	  this	  reason,	  it	  is	  essential	  that	  the	  coalition	  that	  comes	  together	  to	  draft	  a	  new	  plan	  for	  Syria	  has	  no	  ties	  with	  the	  previous	  government.	  Any	  persons	  associated	  with	  supporting	  the	  Assad	  regime	  will	  take	  no	  part	  in	  the	  government	  transition.	  Not	  only	  will	  this	  bring	  back	  the	  bitter	  taste	  of	  his	  ruling,	  but	  as	  Huntington	  explains,	  some	  of	  these	  partners	  will	  try	  to	  quietly	  establish	  a	  dictatorship	  and	  gain	  supporters	  under	  an	  assumed	  democracy	  (151).	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Huntington	  stresses	  that	  creating	  an	  umbrella	  of	  organizations	  that	  help	  facilitate	  operations	  and	  unity	  among	  the	  opposition	  will	  make	  them	  stronger.	  	  
32	  	  
Democracy:	  Can	  it	  exist	  in	  Syria?	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  research,	  democracy	  will	  be	  defined	  “as	  an	  institutional	  arrangement	  for	  arriving	  at	  political	  decisions	  in	  which	  individuals	  acquire	  the	  power	  to	  decide	  by	  means	  of	  a	  competitive	  struggle	  for	  the	  people’s	  vote,”	  as	  quoted	  in	  Huntington’s	  book22.	  	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  our	  democratic	  structure	  is	  ideal	  and	  suitable	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  right?	  Possibly,	  yes.	  We	  live	  under	  a	  governmental	  framework	  that	  does	  not	  give	  possibilities	  for	  leaders	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  anything.	  There	  is	  no	  law	  above	  the	  constitution,	  which,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  is	  the	  key	  to	  the	  continuous	  stability	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  However,	  our	  extensive	  push	  to	  democratize	  the	  world	  continues	  to	  put	  us	  in	  a	  bad	  place	  with	  many	  world	  leaders.	  What	  I	  believe	  we	  have	  failed	  to	  understand	  is	  that	  the	  standards	  to	  create	  democracy	  in	  the	  United	  States	  differ	  than	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  For	  instance,	  they	  stem	  from	  the	  proposed	  natural	  rights:	  life,	  liberty,	  and	  the	  Pursuit	  of	  Happiness.	  The	  democracy	  of	  the	  Western	  World	  branches	  out	  from	  these	  rights,	  along	  with	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  establishing	  security,	  fairness,	  and	  inclusiveness	  in	  our	  society.	  Our	  constitution	  stops	  our	  pursuit	  of	  happiness	  when	  it’s	  infringing	  on	  someone	  else23.	  	  However,	  I	  think	  that	  there	  is	  a	  level	  of	  contradiction	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  democracy	  in	  the	  West.	  America	  is	  built	  on	  a	  dream	  of	  freedom	  and	  opportunity,	  but	  we	  fail	  to	  highlight	  and	  elaborate	  on	  the	  difficult	  road	  that	  was	  taken	  to	  reach	  this	  dream.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  Arab	  nations,	  there	  were	  too	  many	  situations	  where	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  This	  definition	  was	  formulated	  by	  Joseph	  Schumpeter	  and	  was	  labeled	  as	  “another	  theory	  of	  democracy”	  (6).	  23	  This	  means	  that	  our	  social	  contract	  limits	  us	  from	  using	  our	  rights	  to	  infringe	  and	  interfere	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  others	  (Shomar)	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  West	  compromised	  the	  freedoms	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  happiness	  of	  the	  people	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  in	  return	  for	  their	  own	  security.	  While	  forced	  resources	  and	  occupations	  played	  a	  factor	  in	  this,	  I	  think	  the	  lack	  of	  ignorance	  from	  the	  West	  is	  what	  really	  stalled	  the	  development	  of	  proper	  democracy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  
	  
Arab	  World	  Democratization	  	  David	  Shomar,	  author	  of	  Democracy	  and	  the	  Arab	  World	  for	  the	  Syracuse	  Journal	  
of	  International	  Law	  and	  Commerce	  efficiently	  explains	  the	  lack	  of	  movement	  made	  by	  the	  Arab	  community	  to	  maneuver	  through	  the	  conditions	  to	  develop	  a	  democratic	  system.	  However,	  along	  with	  that	  explanation,	  it	  is	  very	  hard	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  help	  Arab	  nations	  develop	  the	  framework	  for	  democracy	  following	  their	  own	  outline.	  Shomar	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  U.S.	  support	  in	  an	  Iraqi	  constitution	  if	  Iraq	  agreed	  to	  create	  separation	  between	  church	  and	  state.	  Not	  only	  would	  this	  create	  tension	  between	  both	  countries,	  but	  also	  it	  would	  be	  incredibly	  difficult	  for	  Iraq,	  whose	  government	  and	  society	  is	  tailored	  to	  religion24.	  The	  idea	  behind	  this	  is	  that	  while	  it’s	  important	  for	  the	  strong	  democratic	  civilizations	  of	  the	  West	  to	  help	  the	  Middle	  East,	  the	  frameworks	  for	  creating	  a	  strongly	  developed	  democratic	  nation	  are	  not	  one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all.	  If	  the	  United	  States	  tries	  to	  impose	  our	  standards	  of	  freedom	  and	  rights	  onto	  these	  countries,	  whose	  tribes	  and	  governments	  are	  generational,	  it	  will	  pose	  a	  sign	  of	  authority	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  rather	  than	  create	  a	  path	  of	  equality.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  impose	  on	  the	  governmental	  system	  of	  a	  Middle	  Eastern	  country,	  we	  should	  consider	  the	  grudge	  being	  held	  against	  the	  U.S.	  by	  those	  citizens.	  Since	  Obama’s	  election	  in	  2008,	  U.S.	  favorability	  ratings	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  According	  to	  Shomar,	  our	  interference	  in	  demanding	  the	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state	  in	  Iraq	  denounces	  their	  ability	  to	  make	  statewide	  decisions	  on	  their	  own.	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  plummeted	  drastically	  in	  the	  among	  the	  Arab	  Nations,	  with	  some	  countries	  favoring	  the	  U.S.	  more	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  versus	  the	  Obama	  Administration25.	  One	  of	  the	  top	  reasons	  ratings	  continue	  to	  fall	  is	  due	  to	  the	  consistent	  U.S.	  support	  towards	  Israel	  in	  the	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  conflict,	  which	  hits	  hard	  for	  a	  large	  majority	  of	  citizens	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  While	  countries	  across	  the	  world	  continue	  to	  condemn	  the	  Israeli	  occupation	  on	  Palestinian,	  the	  U.S.	  continues	  to	  provide	  Israel	  with	  billions	  of	  dollars	  yearly	  in	  military	  aid.	  	  Then	  again,	  Western	  involvement	  in	  Middle	  Eastern	  democratic	  development	  does	  not	  entirely	  depend	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  politics	  alone.	  A	  strong	  role-­‐player	  in	  a	  strong	  built	  country	  is	  the	  economic	  market.	  Emerging	  democracies	  and	  market	  economics	  continue	  to	  conflict	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  development.	  The	  Arab	  World	  is	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  compelled	  interest	  the	  West	  has	  on	  the	  revenue	  that	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  that	  area	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  Arabs	  know	  that	  any	  interest	  shown	  by	  the	  U.S.	  to	  help	  build	  their	  democracies	  isn’t	  coming	  from	  the	  kindness	  of	  their	  hearts,	  but	  because	  they	  have	  their	  eyes	  on	  the	  revenue-­‐generating	  resources	  that	  exist	  in	  that	  area	  of	  the	  world.	  A	  mixed	  economy	  like	  the	  U.S.,	  with	  widespread	  benefits	  will	  conflict	  with	  the	  free	  market	  system	  of	  many	  Arab	  countries,	  where	  financial	  security	  is	  passed	  down	  through	  hierarchical	  ties	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  family	  and	  tribes.	  Basically,	  the	  system	  comes	  off	  as	  an	  every-­‐man-­‐for-­‐himself,	  rather	  than	  widespread	  bonus	  for	  everyone.	  If	  an	  imposed	  proposal	  for	  democracy	  comes	  to	  the	  Arab	  World	  by	  the	  West,	  then	  the	  proposal	  should	  be	  strong	  enough	  to	  deter	  any	  doubts	  of	  inevitable	  disadvantages	  caused	  by	  a	  democratic	  economy.	  If	  these	  Arabs	  have	  been	  working	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  The	  countries	  surveyed	  in	  this	  speech	  said	  that	  U.S.	  interference	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  is	  a	  great	  obstacle	  to	  peace	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  region	  (Arab	  American	  Institute).	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  the	  same	  free	  market	  system	  through	  generational	  tribal	  systems,	  then	  the	  proposed	  democratic	  economy	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  fair	  trade	  (Shomar).	  What’s	  unique	  about	  Shomar	  and	  Huntington	  is	  that	  they	  have	  both	  developed	  democratic	  frameworks	  that	  tie	  in	  together.	  While	  Huntington’s	  ideas	  are	  based	  on	  a	  more	  general	  perspective	  of	  overthrowing	  a	  regime	  and	  developing	  a	  democracy,	  Shomar	  narrows	  down	  his	  framework	  strategies	  to	  fall	  in	  place	  with	  the	  known	  status	  quos	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  are.	  On	  the	  contrary	  to	  Huntington’s	  guidelines,	  Shomar’s	  outline	  can	  help	  relate	  to	  the	  withstanding	  conflicts	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  which	  ties	  back	  to	  evaluating	  Syria’s	  compatibility	  to	  compromising	  with	  the	  existing	  conflicts	  between	  Western	  democratization	  in	  the	  Arab	  World.	  Shomar	  gives	  two	  potential	  scenarios	  that	  could	  occur	  when	  the	  occupier	  intervenes	  into	  the	  nation	  to	  assist	  with	  the	  development	  of	  a	  brighter	  future.	  The	  first	  scenario	  results	  in	  ending	  the	  latest	  conflict	  between	  the	  occupier	  and	  the	  newly	  liberated	  country,	  only	  to	  wait	  for	  it	  to	  spark	  up	  later	  on.	  In	  Shomar’s	  explanation,	  this	  scenario	  ends	  with	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  newly	  originated	  culture.	  The	  second	  path,	  the	  ending	  violence	  would	  result	  in	  the	  annihilation	  of	  the	  newly	  indigenous	  culture	  and	  its	  people.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  both	  scenarios,	  the	  outcomes	  don’t	  necessarily	  mean	  an	  end	  to	  the	  relations.	  For	  the	  first	  case,	  if	  occupier-­‐created	  liberation	  is	  the	  outcome,	  there	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  years	  and	  years	  of	  distrust	  between	  both	  countries.	  The	  establishment	  and	  development	  of	  the	  culture,	  does	  not	  guarantee	  that	  both	  sides	  will	  leave	  happily.	  The	  new	  society	  may	  have	  unhealed	  wounds	  from	  the	  occupier,	  and	  may	  continue	  to	  use	  these	  old	  wounds	  as	  motives	  for	  new	  conflicts	  on	  a	  road	  to	  revenge.	  It’s	  not	  unreasonable,	  and	  the	  way	  Shomar	  explains	  it,	  the	  new	  culture	  would	  still	  hold	  a	  grudge	  against	  the	  occupying	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  country.	  The	  disadvantage	  of	  this	  would	  be	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  new	  country,	  as	  well	  as	  any	  established	  agreements	  between	  the	  civilizations	  as	  allies	  in	  creating	  a	  new	  culture.	  Basically,	  all	  the	  effort	  made	  to	  create	  the	  newly	  liberalized	  democratic	  society	  would	  crash	  and	  burn.	  	  For	  the	  second	  path,	  if	  the	  occupying	  country	  destroys	  the	  new	  population,	  they’ll	  continue	  with	  the	  illusion	  of	  winning	  the	  battle.	  In	  this	  case,	  Shomar	  relates	  the	  situation	  to	  American	  ancestors	  destroying	  Native	  American	  culture.	  While	  we’ve	  tried	  to	  preserve	  what	  was	  left	  of	  the	  original	  inhabitants	  of	  America,	  the	  constant	  cloud	  of	  denial	  will	  continue	  to	  loom	  over	  this	  country.	  The	  last	  framework	  by	  Shomar	  that	  I	  want	  to	  explain	  shows	  that	  the	  best	  approach	  that	  can	  be	  made	  by	  the	  occupier	  is	  to	  enter	  that	  country	  with	  humble	  goals	  and	  respect	  for	  the	  values	  of	  that	  culture.	  Instead	  of	  entering	  the	  country	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  victory	  for	  the	  occupier,	  they	  should	  disconnect	  themselves	  from	  the	  image	  of	  enemy	  with	  superiority.	  Shomar	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  the	  U.S.	  with	  Japan	  and	  Germany	  after	  World	  War	  II.	  Our	  humble	  approach	  and	  respect	  to	  their	  rebuilding	  process	  of	  society	  and	  civilizations	  led	  to	  half	  a	  century	  of	  strong	  relations	  between	  the	  countries.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Syria,	  this	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  U.S.	  enter	  the	  country	  with	  no	  intentions	  on	  claiming	  victory	  for	  the	  fall	  of	  Assad	  and	  a	  new	  democratic	  government,	  but	  instead	  enter	  the	  country	  with	  no	  agenda,	  and	  respect	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  nation	  to	  rebuild	  itself	  with	  no	  influence.	  If	  Syria	  were	  to	  be	  free	  from	  Assad,	  the	  last	  thing	  the	  country	  would	  need	  is	  the	  United	  States	  implementing	  a	  governmental	  structure	  on	  them.	  Instead,	  as	  I	  said	  earlier	  in	  the	  guidelines	  of	  overthrowing	  a	  regime,	  the	  U.S.	  along	  with	  other	  global	  powers	  should	  draft	  a	  plan	  for	  a	  transitional	  government	  in	  Syria	  if	  Assad	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  were	  to	  be	  removed.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  U.S.	  needs	  to	  take	  it	  upon	  themselves	  to	  dictate	  the	  country;	  it	  means	  that	  they	  play	  the	  role	  democratic	  supporters	  and	  allow	  Syria	  to	  reconstruct	  itself26.	  	  So,	  can	  Shomar’s	  structure	  relate	  to	  Syria	  on	  a	  deeper	  level?	  Realistically,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  all	  of	  the	  steps	  in	  the	  framework	  provided	  by	  Shomar	  can	  apply	  to	  the	  Syrian	  regime.	  For	  starters,	  the	  first	  two	  paths	  seem	  shaky	  in	  determining	  an	  end	  result	  of	  the	  situation.	  More	  than	  that,	  I	  did	  not	  find	  that	  Shomar’s	  structure	  was	  a	  means	  of	  democratization	  as	  much	  as	  it	  was	  gentle	  interference.	  I	  will	  not	  deny	  that	  his	  explanations	  are	  realistic	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  creating	  a	  supervised	  draft	  of	  government	  order,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  synchronize	  well	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  democratization.	  It	  is	  not	  as	  much	  of	  a	  framework	  as	  it	  is	  a	  game	  plan	  for	  the	  West	  to	  gently	  interfere	  without	  coming	  off	  as	  pushy.	  	  
Framework	  Comparison	  and	  Analysis	  In	  a	  situation	  like	  the	  one	  in	  Syria,	  applying	  the	  frameworks	  that	  I’ve	  discussed	  so	  far	  is	  very	  difficult.	  First	  of	  all,	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  Shomar’s	  framework	  is	  applicable	  because	  of	  the	  ISIS	  occupation.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  apply	  it	  when	  the	  regime	  began,	  with	  the	  regime	  being	  the	  only	  forced	  occupation	  in	  Syria,	  then	  most	  aspects	  of	  the	  framework	  would	  have	  been	  applicable	  to	  achieving	  a	  plan	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  democratic	  state.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  ISIS	  has	  been	  added	  to	  the	  occupiers	  of	  the	  country.	  To	  clarify,	  I	  am	  not	  implying	  that	  ISIS	  has	  the	  same	  level	  of	  power	  as	  the	  Syrian	  to	  be	  an	  occupier	  of	  the	  country,	  but	  their	  presence	  and	  decent	  level	  of	  military	  and	  weapon	  power	  places	  them	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Shomar’s	  framework	  is	  a	  little	  fluffy.	  It’s	  reasonable,	  but	  I	  think	  it’s	  only	  applied	  in	  a	  world	  where	  unity	  exists	  peacefully	  with	  no	  disputes.	  	  
38	  	  at	  a	  high	  threat	  for	  Syria.	  With	  that,	  I	  also	  want	  to	  consider	  their	  focus	  of	  creating	  an	  entire	  Sunni	  Islamic	  State.	  What’s	  unique	  to	  me	  is	  that	  ISIS	  has	  not	  made	  efforts	  to	  seize	  control	  of	  the	  Assad	  House,	  who	  is	  Alawite	  Muslim,	  falling	  under	  the	  Shiite	  sect	  of	  Islam.	  We’ve	  already	  seen	  ISIS	  aggressiveness	  to	  gain	  control	  of	  the	  Shiite-­‐majority	  Iranian	  government,	  but	  the	  same	  efforts	  have	  not	  been	  made	  towards	  Assad.	  	   With	  the	  continuing	  ISIS	  involvement	  in	  Syria	  during	  the	  regime,	  this	  places	  less	  attention	  on	  Assad’s	  regime	  as	  an	  authoritarian	  leader,	  and	  more	  attention	  on	  the	  fact	  he’s	  leading	  a	  country	  undergoing	  a	  civil	  war	  and	  an	  occupation	  by	  a	  terrorist	  organization.	  For	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  I	  see	  this	  as	  a	  chance	  for	  them	  to	  pitch	  in	  and	  participate	  in	  strengthening	  the	  rebels—who	  are	  essentially	  fighting	  for	  freedom—against	  ISIS.	  At	  this	  point,	  Bashar	  is	  a	  key	  ally	  to	  the	  West	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  ISIS.	  Obama’s	  statement	  was	  right—Assad	  needs	  to	  leave	  the	  country	  in	  order	  for	  us	  to	  defeat	  ISIS.	  However,	  as	  I	  said	  earlier,	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  a	  political	  transition	  with	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  terrorist	  organization	  in	  a	  country	  so	  fragile	  would	  be	  the	  wisest	  approach.	  To	  add	  to	  that,	  neither	  Huntington	  nor	  Shomar	  show	  any	  evidence	  of	  such	  a	  transition	  being	  successful.	  	  To	  begin	  with,	  I	  find	  that	  Shomar’s	  framework	  and	  steps	  are	  very	  soft	  touching	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  battling	  terrorism	  in	  a	  corrupt	  country.	  If	  we	  were	  dealing	  with	  the	  Assad	  regime	  on	  it’s	  own,	  with	  no	  interference	  from	  ISIS,	  then	  it	  would	  hold	  a	  better	  standing.	  But	  in	  my	  perspective,	  Shomar’s	  entire	  framework	  is	  built	  on	  this	  idea	  of	  gently	  removing	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  without	  doing	  harm	  to	  the	  country.	  ISIS	  has	  done	  more	  harm	  socially	  and	  economically	  to	  Syria,	  especially	  considering	  the	  amount	  of	  refugees	  that	  have	  fled	  the	  country	  in	  order	  to	  escape.	  In	  






Concluding	  Scenarios	  As	  I	  begin	  the	  conclusions	  to	  my	  research,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  outline	  that	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  there	  is	  a	  set	  solution	  to	  resolve	  the	  Syrian	  crisis.	  I	  also	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  any	  significant	  resolutions	  will	  take	  place	  within	  the	  next	  five	  years.	  However,	  from	  my	  research,	  analysis,	  and	  extensive	  reading,	  I’ve	  come	  up	  with	  a	  set	  of	  three	  hypothetical	  concluding	  solutions	  to	  finalize	  my	  research.	  I	  am	  not	  a	  scholar,	  however,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  set	  of	  these	  three	  scenarios	  are	  logically	  reasonable	  as	  potential	  solutions.	  These	  scenarios	  and	  conclusions	  are	  completely	  built	  by	  me,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  my	  research	  and	  sources.	  My	  first	  concluding	  solution	  is	  rebuilding	  a	  democratic	  government	  in	  Syria	  based	  off	  of	  the	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  framework.	  The	  start	  of	  the	  agreement	  between	  the	  countries	  came	  as	  an	  end	  to	  the	  war	  in	  Bosnia,	  and	  it	  was	  also	  signed	  by	  Serbia	  and	  Croatia.	  Ultimately,	  this	  framework	  aimed	  to	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  the	  war	  and	  create	  and	  outline	  set	  of	  government	  standards	  needed	  to	  establish	  a	  country.	  The	  agreement	  served	  as	  a	  means	  of	  stability	  and	  peace	  in	  the	  area.	  What’s	  unique	  about	  the	  framework	  is	  that	  the	  participants	  were	  taken	  out	  of	  their	  comfort	  zone,	  all	  the	  way	  in	  Ohio,	  to	  sign	  the	  agreement.	  I	  think	  this	  served	  as	  a	  humorous	  way	  to	  force	  everyone	  to	  come	  to	  an	  ultimatum	  with	  no	  way	  out	  (Dayton	  Peace	  Agreement).	  Ultimately,	  the	  peace	  agreement	  aimed	  to	  promote	  stability	  and	  prosperity	  as	  an	  entire	  state,	  rather	  than	  two	  battling	  nations.	  Although	  Syria	  is	  not	  at	  war	  with	  another	  country	  in	  a	  fight	  for	  independence,	  the	  agreement	  tying	  the	  countries	  as	  one	  has	  points	  that	  promote	  democratization	  with	  a	  gentle,	  non-­‐aggressive	  approach.	  The	  annexes	  in	  the	  framework	  
41	  	  promote	  severe	  democratization	  changes,	  however,	  they	  are	  not	  invasive	  and	  sudden,	  therefore	  making	  the	  transition	  more	  peaceful.	  	  	  The	  general	  framework	  in	  the	  agreement	  held	  the	  promise	  that	  both	  countries	  would	  exist	  together	  with	  respects	  to	  each	  other’s	  sovereign	  equality	  and	  to	  settle	  all	  disputes	  peacefully.	  Now,	  I	  understand	  that	  Syria	  is	  not	  in	  conflict	  with	  co-­‐existing	  with	  another	  nation.	  However,	  the	  Annexes	  listed	  in	  the	  Dayton	  agreement	  create	  a	  reasonable	  outline	  that,	  I	  believe,	  helps	  compliment	  Huntington’s	  initial	  democratization	  framework.	  I	  will	  not	  apply	  each	  annex	  of	  the	  agreement,	  because	  they	  are	  not	  all	  applicable	  to	  the	  content	  of	  my	  research.	  While	  the	  agreement	  aims	  to	  create	  political	  stability	  and	  order	  between	  two,	  newly	  formed	  democratic	  nations,	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  its	  associations	  can	  all	  be	  tied	  to	  the	  democratization	  of	  Syria	  when	  considering	  the	  realistic	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  situation.	  The	  Dayton	  Peace	  Agreement	  constructs	  a	  framework	  for	  two	  torn	  nations	  to	  become	  a	  sovereign	  state	  with	  recognition	  as	  long	  as	  they	  apply	  by	  that	  framework.	  Syria	  has	  been	  broken	  apart	  and	  divided	  by	  religious	  sects,	  terrorist	  organizations	  and	  their	  affiliates,	  as	  well	  as	  revolution	  fighters	  and	  regime	  supporters.	  So,	  while	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  framework	  has	  a	  60%	  success	  rate,	  I	  can	  only	  go	  so	  far	  with	  how	  I	  analyze	  it	  and	  apply	  it.	  	  Before	  I	  break	  down	  the	  agreement	  and	  its	  annexes,	  we	  need	  to	  take	  a	  look	  at	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  that	  create	  Syria,	  also	  known	  as	  its	  constitution.	  As	  I	  mentioned	  earlier,	  under	  the	  current	  constitution,	  Assad	  has	  won	  his	  third	  seven-­‐year	  term	  as	  President	  of	  Syria.	  Not	  only	  that,	  but	  while	  Hafez	  Al-­‐Assad	  was	  in	  power,	  the	  original	  constitution	  was	  modified	  enough	  to	  brand	  the	  country	  as	  a	  means	  to	  the	  Baath	  Party,	  therefore,	  reconstructing	  to	  support	  a	  government	  that	  would	  benefit	  the	  Baath	  party.	  
42	  	  The	  irony	  in	  this	  situation	  is	  that	  during	  Bashar’s	  later	  years	  as	  president,	  rather	  than	  following	  through	  with	  his	  promise	  to	  the	  Syrian	  people	  of	  a	  fair	  government,	  he	  appointed	  a	  committee	  of	  people	  to	  draft	  up	  a	  ‘new	  constitution’	  that	  introduced	  multiparty	  system	  elections.	  As	  I	  point	  out	  earlier,	  the	  new	  constitution	  didn’t	  mean	  anything.	  Bashar	  is	  still	  in	  power,	  and	  this	  constitution	  will	  keep	  him	  in	  power	  for	  about	  another	  decade	  (Fares).	  	  With	  regards	  the	  Syrian	  constitution,	  we	  move	  into	  the	  Annex	  4	  in	  the	  agreement,	  which	  calls	  for	  a	  new	  constitution	  tying	  the	  countries,	  but	  recognizing	  their	  borders.	  My	  order	  of	  the	  annexes	  is	  based	  off	  the	  level	  of	  importance	  it	  plays	  in	  the	  democratic	  framework.	  Annex	  4	  is	  the	  most	  crucial	  to	  the	  entire	  agreement.	  In	  order	  for	  an	  authoritarian-­‐ruled	  country	  to	  stabilize	  and	  democratize,	  a	  new	  constitution	  must	  be	  put	  into	  place	  to	  prevent	  previous	  issues	  from	  happening	  again	  (Dayton	  Peace	  Agreement).	  By	  calling	  for	  a	  new	  constitution	  in	  Syria,	  this	  would	  banish	  traces	  of	  the	  disguised	  authoritarian	  regime	  created	  by	  the	  Assad	  family.	  As	  I	  said	  earlier,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  Baath	  party	  was	  created	  to	  benefit	  the	  family	  in	  power.	  The	  Party	  and	  the	  Assad	  government	  not	  only	  held	  an	  iron-­‐grip	  on	  all	  things	  state	  and	  society,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  military.	  The	  president	  is	  the	  commander	  in	  chief	  as	  well	  as	  head	  of	  all	  the	  intelligence	  agencies	  in	  the	  party.	  This	  means	  that	  Assad	  has	  control	  of	  anything	  and	  everything	  involving	  military	  force	  and	  nationwide	  intelligence.	  It	  wouldn’t	  be	  hard	  to	  erase	  what	  might	  make	  him	  look	  bad.	  No	  bullet	  is	  shot	  without	  his	  approval	  and	  he	  chooses	  what’s	  openly	  announced	  to	  the	  public.	  This	  creates	  corruption	  politically	  and	  socially.	  If	  the	  leader	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  organizations	  that	  are	  meant	  to	  expose	  secrets	  of	  the	  country,	  how	  will	  the	  people	  know	  if	  their	  government	  is	  as	  transparent	  as	  they	  say?	  What’s	  
43	  	  ironic	  is	  that	  the	  Baath	  Party	  constitution	  aims	  to	  offer	  unified	  freedom	  to	  the	  people,	  but	  it	  comes	  within	  the	  comfort	  zone	  of	  the	  president.	  Civilian	  freedom	  ends	  when	  his	  exposure	  begins.	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  the	  annex	  regarding	  military	  in	  the	  Dayton	  Peace	  Agreement	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  Syria’s	  case	  because	  the	  state	  is	  not	  trying	  to	  coexist	  with	  another,	  but	  rather	  exist	  democratically	  itself.	  The	  foundations	  drafted	  in	  the	  constitution	  that	  discuss	  elections,	  military	  and	  government	  involvement,	  as	  well	  as	  citizenship	  rights	  must	  represent	  democratic	  intentions.	  	  	   The	  second	  important	  annex	  to	  Syria’s	  framework	  is	  regional	  stabilization.	  The	  agreement	  explains	  how	  negotiations	  fall	  into	  the	  framework	  by	  forcing	  the	  signing	  nations	  to	  agree	  on	  confidence	  building	  measures,	  such	  as	  restricted	  imports	  or	  military	  activity.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  put	  Syria	  in	  this	  category,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  confidence	  building	  measures	  would	  ultimately	  have	  to	  exist	  with	  Iran,	  United	  States,	  and	  Russia.	  I	  put	  these	  as	  the	  top	  three	  negotiators/members	  of	  stability	  because	  they’ve	  had	  the	  most	  involvement	  in	  trying	  to	  take	  action	  against	  or	  protect	  the	  Assad	  regime.	  Before	  this	  framework	  can	  even	  be	  applied,	  Iran	  and	  Russia	  have	  to	  sign	  on.	  We’ve	  seen	  this	  extensive	  battle	  between	  the	  United	  States	  proposing	  action	  and	  Russia	  and	  Iran	  striking	  them	  down	  out	  of	  commitment	  to	  Assad.	  Truthfully,	  the	  only	  moment	  that	  I	  saw	  positive	  movement	  from	  both	  countries	  is	  their	  advisory	  to	  Assad	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  the	  chemical	  weapons	  after	  he	  blasted	  them	  on	  more	  than	  50,000	  people.	  	   What	  is	  crucial	  about	  this	  regional	  stability	  agreement	  is	  that	  these	  nations,	  although	  geographically	  distant	  from	  the	  Middle	  East,	  must	  maintain	  their	  involvement	  in	  the	  negotiations.	  By	  this,	  I	  mean	  that	  they	  must	  be	  active	  in	  proposing	  restrictions	  on	  how	  far	  the	  new	  government	  can	  go.	  I’m	  not	  putting	  them	  in	  charge	  of	  rebuilding	  the	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  country,	  but	  they	  should	  be	  in	  a	  monitoring	  position.	  Establish	  a	  set	  of	  agreements	  in	  categories	  like	  importing	  heavy	  weapons,	  ammunition,	  chemical	  weapons	  or	  even	  nuclear	  weapons,	  as	  well	  as	  restricting	  military	  involvement	  in	  the	  public	  community.	  This	  should	  be	  the	  top	  concern.	  The	  military	  should	  by	  no	  means	  play	  the	  role	  of	  housekeeping	  and	  try	  to	  keep	  the	  social	  structure	  in	  order.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  their	  unbreakable	  commitment	  to	  the	  government	  was	  a	  big	  factor	  that	  increased	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Syria.	  The	  military	  should	  maintain	  the	  position	  of	  defenders	  of	  that	  nation	  and	  nothing	  else.	  In	  time	  of	  war,	  they	  are	  set	  out	  to	  fight.	  However,	  in	  time	  of	  political	  dispute	  or	  disruption,	  they	  do	  not	  side	  violently	  with	  the	  government	  to	  conflict	  with	  the	  people.	  There	  should	  be	  a	  national	  guard	  put	  in	  place	  for	  this,	  with	  the	  sole	  role	  of	  helping	  maintain	  social	  and	  political	  harmony	  in	  the	  country.	  While	  there	  will	  always	  be	  political	  disagreement,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  guard	  should	  be	  to	  keep	  the	  community	  safe.	  There	  needs	  to	  be	  an	  emphasis	  to	  not	  use	  physical	  force	  against	  crowds	  freely	  and	  peacefully	  protesting	  against	  the	  government.	  This	  is	  absolute	  key.	  	   A	  final	  annex	  that	  I	  want	  to	  elaborate	  on	  is	  elections.	  Annex	  three	  explains	  the	  importance	  of	  free,	  fair,	  and	  supervised	  elections	  after	  the	  established	  agreement.	  It	  discusses	  elections	  in	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  government,	  not	  just	  the	  presidency.	  By	  these	  elections,	  the	  president	  would	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  appoint	  officials	  in	  the	  houses	  as	  he	  pleases.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Syria,	  fair	  elections	  would	  be	  the	  biggest	  bond	  to	  proving	  they	  will	  become	  democratic.	  As	  I	  discussed	  earlier,	  despite	  all	  the	  turmoil,	  stress,	  tension,	  and	  bloodshed	  in	  Syria,	  Assad	  was	  re-­‐elected	  by	  a	  shocking	  88%	  of	  votes.	  These	  elections	  were	  held	  in	  government-­‐controlled	  areas,	  limiting	  them	  to	  mostly	  regime	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  supporters	  27.	  A	  post-­‐Assad	  Syria	  will	  have	  high	  expectations	  of	  an	  election	  immediately	  after	  he	  is	  out	  of	  office.	  I	  agree	  with	  this,	  but	  Assad	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  main	  concern	  of	  Syria.	  In	  order	  for	  any	  democratic	  structure	  to	  be	  established,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  some	  action	  that	  will	  help	  decrease	  the	  power	  of	  ISIS	  in	  the	  country.	  Their	  dramatically	  increasing	  in	  size	  and	  expansion,	  which	  is	  helping	  them	  spread	  farther	  and	  faster.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  ISIS	  will	  see	  the	  time	  between	  Assad’s	  removal	  and	  a	  new	  leader	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  expand	  politically	  and	  forcefully.	  The	  country	  is	  in	  a	  very	  fragile	  state,	  and	  any	  sudden	  movements	  can	  have	  a	  domino	  effect	  on	  what	  may	  happen	  next.	  	  	   One	  last	  point,	  not	  directly	  mentioned	  in	  the	  agreement,	  is	  economic	  reconstruction.	  Syria’s	  economy	  is	  continuing	  to	  deteriorate	  and	  the	  transitioning	  government	  needs	  to	  offer	  hope	  of	  economic	  stability.	  The	  post-­‐Assad	  period	  needs	  to	  prioritize	  the	  damaged	  lives	  of	  the	  citizens	  during	  the	  regime.	  While	  political	  relief	  and	  stability	  is	  crucial,	  providing	  economic	  and	  social	  stability	  and	  reform	  will	  help	  reorganize	  the	  way	  of	  life.	  The	  new	  government	  must	  make	  a	  means	  to	  provide	  basic	  services,	  such	  as	  food,	  relief,	  and	  shelter	  to	  areas	  and	  homes	  damaged	  by	  the	  war.	  An	  economic	  plan	  must	  be	  drafted	  that	  will	  rebuild	  necessary	  jobs	  that	  will	  help	  resynchronize	  economic	  function.	  In	  the	  Day	  After	  Project,	  the	  authors	  suggest	  that	  prior	  to	  the	  regime	  change	  assessments,	  the	  immediate	  priorities	  need	  to	  be	  specified.	  The	  transitioning	  government	  needs	  to	  have	  a	  set	  starting	  point	  before	  they	  take	  over.	  The	  state	  is	  too	  fragile	  for	  a	  new	  government	  to	  set	  down	  the	  rules	  as	  they	  go.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  reform,	  outside	  networks	  need	  to	  supervise	  and	  possibly	  participate	  in	  what	  will	  happen.	  We	  cannot	  rely	  on	  this	  new	  government	  to	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  According	  to	  the	  article	  by	  the	  Guardian,	  as	  well	  as	  what	  Abu-­‐Ibrahim	  told	  me,	  these	  elections	  excluded	  all	  the	  areas	  that	  had	  anti-­‐Assad	  protestors.	  Essentially,	  regime	  supporters	  were	  the	  only	  ones	  that	  voted.	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  fair	  and	  reasonable.	  In	  fact,	  consider	  the	  new	  government	  an	  infant.	  In	  order	  to	  learn	  to	  crawl,	  stand,	  and	  walk,	  they	  need	  a	  guardian	  to	  hold	  their	  hand	  and	  pull	  them	  up	  in	  the	  process.	  They	  cannot	  be	  trusted	  to	  make	  moves	  on	  their	  own	  right	  away	  (The	  Day	  After	  Project).	  	  	   This	  concludes	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  first	  possible	  solution	  to	  the	  Syrian	  crisis.	  After	  analyzing	  and	  researching	  this	  hypothesis,	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  has	  a	  60%	  chance	  of	  occurring	  and	  pulling	  through.	  However,	  I	  am	  not	  a	  scholar,	  and	  although	  my	  research	  has	  been	  as	  thorough	  as	  I	  can	  make	  it,	  there	  are	  still	  a	  lot	  of	  empty	  spaces	  that	  are	  not	  filled.	  However,	  I	  can	  say	  that	  the	  agreement	  for	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  realistically	  successful.	  I	  think	  that	  it’s	  an	  ideal	  framework	  in	  terms	  of	  drafting	  out	  a	  structure	  for	  a	  newly	  democratized	  country,	  but	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  tailored	  to	  address	  my	  specific	  topic.	  Democratization	  in	  Syria	  will	  not	  happen	  for	  a	  very	  long	  time,	  and	  when	  it	  does	  happen,	  I’m	  not	  sure	  that	  my	  analysis	  of	  these	  frameworks	  will	  be	  applicable.	  However,	  for	  this	  point	  in	  my	  research,	  the	  Dayton	  Peace	  Agreement	  highlights	  the	  key	  points	  and	  mechanisms	  needed	  for	  a	  democratic	  nation.	  	   At	  this	  point,	  I	  am	  moving	  to	  my	  second	  and	  third	  conclusions,	  which	  will	  be	  tied	  together.	  After	  several	  days	  of	  research,	  interviews,	  and	  discussions,	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  was	  the	  most	  logical	  choice	  to	  tie	  these	  scenarios	  together	  because	  of	  the	  uncertainty	  that	  remains	  behind	  them.	  I	  was	  not	  able	  to	  gather	  enough	  scholarly	  or	  journalistic	  evidence	  to	  support	  my	  hypothesis,	  and	  I	  solely	  relied	  on	  credible	  interviews	  with	  Syrian	  refugees	  for	  this	  information.	  My	  sources	  wish	  to	  remain	  anonymous	  for	  this	  research	  because	  they	  still	  have	  loved	  ones	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  regime.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  research,	  I	  will	  address	  them	  as	  Mira,	  Sarah,	  and	  Ahmad.	  All	  three	  of	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  them	  are	  reliable	  and	  have	  had	  experiences	  with	  the	  regime	  firsthand.	  From	  escaping	  their	  homes	  to	  learning	  about	  family	  deaths,	  their	  stories	  help	  support	  my	  following	  hypothetical	  conclusions.	  However,	  I	  find	  that	  my	  hypothetical	  conclusions	  contradict	  each	  other	  at	  a	  certain	  level.	  	   The	  beginning	  point	  of	  this	  hypothesis	  is	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Syria.	  At	  the	  start	  of	  the	  regime,	  President	  Obama	  gave	  a	  limit	  to	  Assad’s	  brutality	  with	  a	  ‘red-­‐line’	  that	  truly,	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  did	  anything.	  The	  brutality	  and	  damage	  of	  the	  chemical	  attacks	  and	  human	  rights	  violations	  pushed	  Obama	  to	  make	  efforts	  against	  Assad.	  With	  all	  that	  being	  said,	  I’m	  not	  denying	  the	  attempt	  of	  United	  States	  involvement	  and	  intervention.	  It	  was	  there	  at	  first,	  but	  the	  agenda	  quickly	  shifted	  when	  the	  U.S.	  became	  a	  target.	  The	  creation	  of	  the	  Islamic	  State	  deterred	  the	  focus	  from	  the	  regime	  to	  their	  threats	  of	  a	  new	  Islamic	  nation.	  Instead	  of	  looking	  at	  Syria	  as	  a	  nation	  of	  war	  and	  bloodshed	  under	  a	  brutal	  regime,	  they	  saw	  ISIS’	  threat	  to	  destroy	  the	  west	  and	  create	  a	  new	  Middle	  East.	  Here	  is	  where	  my	  hypothetical	  analysis	  will	  begin.	  	   This	  hypothesis	  started	  as	  a	  potential	  solution,	  but	  the	  more	  thought	  I	  gave	  it,	  the	  more	  illegitimate	  it	  seemed.	  When	  it	  came	  to	  the	  regime,	  Assad	  was	  very	  unwilling	  to	  accept	  any	  type	  of	  involvement	  that	  would	  threaten	  his	  seat	  in	  power.	  The	  idea	  of	  U.S.	  strikes	  or	  aid	  to	  the	  civilians	  was	  unacceptable.	  Of	  course,	  being	  in	  his	  position,	  he	  does	  not	  want	  to	  feel	  the	  threat	  of	  outside	  powers	  assisting	  the	  opposition.	  He’s	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  war	  with	  the	  people;	  there	  was	  no	  way	  he	  would	  accept	  outside	  intervention	  that	  might	  demolish	  the	  government	  he	  tried	  so	  hard	  to	  build.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  he’s	  said	  in	  limited	  interviews	  that	  he	  refuses	  the	  U.S.	  campaign	  on	  ISIS	  because	  it’s	  cooperation	  with	  terrorism;	  more	  specifically,	  their	  willingness	  to	  train	  and	  assist	  the	  rebels	  fighting	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  his	  regime.	  But	  in	  other	  moments,	  Syria	  seemed	  to	  have	  cooperated	  with	  the	  U.S.	  during	  their	  first	  strikes	  against	  ISIS.	  	  	   When	  I	  asked	  Mira,	  her	  thoughts	  about	  this,	  she	  laughed.	  She	  asked	  me	  if	  thought	  it	  was	  funny	  how,	  ISIS	  did	  not	  consistently	  target	  all	  by	  coincidence	  and	  luck,	  regime-­‐controlled	  areas.	  She	  also	  asked	  me	  why	  is	  it	  that	  ISIS	  has	  been	  able	  to	  capture	  and	  behead	  non-­‐Syrian	  citizens	  publicly,	  but	  haven’t	  captured	  any	  leading	  regime	  fighters	  or	  officials.	  And	  why	  exactly	  is	  it	  that,	  despite	  ISIS’	  continuous	  threats	  against	  non-­‐Sunni	  Muslims,	  they	  haven’t	  stepped	  near	  the	  Alawite	  sects	  of	  Syria?	  Her	  questions	  stirred	  up	  my	  original	  conclusions,	  and	  followed	  along	  with	  Abu	  Ibrahim’s	  statements.	  I	  had	  drafted	  out	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  U.S.	  and	  Syrian	  cooperation	  to	  defeat	  ISIS	  together	  in	  exchange	  for	  Assad	  stepping	  down	  as	  president.	  This	  hypothesis	  was	  a	  long	  shot,	  and	  I	  had	  no	  hard	  evidence	  to	  slightly	  support	  this	  idea.	  My	  reasoning	  behind	  this	  was	  that	  ISIS’	  growth	  rate	  was	  increasing	  quickly,	  and	  the	  crisis	  in	  Syria	  would	  only	  get	  worse	  if	  the	  Islamic	  State	  collided	  with	  the	  regime.	  Yes,	  they’re	  cooperating	  on	  a	  certain	  level	  now.	  But	  as	  I	  said	  before,	  it	  is	  a	  marriage	  of	  convenience.	  If	  the	  regime,	  or	  ISIS,	  gets	  to	  a	  point	  where	  they	  do	  not	  need	  the	  other,	  the	  situation	  will	  deteriorate	  further,	  and	  at	  this	  point,	  there	  is	  no	  guessing	  what	  might	  come	  out	  of	  it.	  Her	  questions	  shed	  a	  new	  light	  to	  my	  conclusions:	  a	  dual	  cooperation	  between	  U.S.	  and	  Assad,	  along	  with	  Assad	  and	  ISIS.	  As	  I	  begin	  this	  elaboration,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  stress	  that	  this	  explanation	  is	  not	  backed	  by	  evidence,	  but	  it	  solely	  based	  on	  knowledge	  and	  discussion	  from	  my	  interviews.	  	   Following	  my	  hypothesis,	  let’s	  explore	  the	  scenario	  of	  a	  U.S.-­‐Syrian	  agreement	  to	  fight	  ISIS.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  say	  that	  Assad	  agreed	  to	  the	  campaign	  against	  the	  Islamic	  State	  with	  America,	  he	  would	  do	  so	  with	  an	  agenda.	  From	  his	  interviews,	  he’s	  said	  that	  he	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  refuses	  to	  cooperate	  because	  the	  U.S.	  is	  in	  support	  with	  the	  rebels	  trying	  to	  overthrow	  his	  government.	  With	  that	  being	  explained,	  we	  will	  assume	  that	  in	  order	  for	  him	  to	  sign	  on	  to	  this	  campaign,	  the	  United	  States	  must	  agree	  to	  withdraw	  training	  and	  support	  to	  the	  rebels,	  in	  which	  case	  they	  would	  be	  left	  to	  their	  own	  independent	  training	  and	  scarce	  resources	  to	  fight	  the	  regime.	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  Syrian	  people	  is	  their	  top	  priority	  anymore.	  Although	  at	  one	  point,	  the	  international	  community	  was	  focused	  on	  saving	  the	  civilians,	  their	  agendas	  switched	  when	  major	  global	  powers	  were	  threatened	  by	  the	  terrorist	  organization.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  look	  at	  this	  hypothetical	  agreement	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  international	  security,	  the	  U.S.	  would	  have	  to	  either	  represent	  themselves	  as	  supporters	  of	  the	  regime,	  or,	  blindly	  deny	  the	  agreement	  and	  show	  that	  they	  are	  not	  willing	  to	  stand	  against	  the	  Muslims	  to	  save	  their	  country.	  No	  side	  has	  a	  positive	  outcome.	  Obama	  agreeing	  to	  the	  deal	  would	  be	  that	  his	  promises	  to	  support	  the	  revolution	  and	  punish	  Assad	  would	  be	  were	  worthless;	  but	  denying	  the	  agreement	  and	  continuing	  to	  train	  and	  work	  with	  the	  rebels	  will	  show	  him	  as	  a	  president	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  security	  of	  a	  war-­‐torn	  country	  rather	  than	  the	  safety	  of	  his	  own.	  	  	   If	  we	  assume	  that	  Obama	  sides	  with	  Assad	  in	  this	  hypothetical	  agreement,	  then	  we	  assume	  that	  Assad	  pledges	  allegiance	  to	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  the	  Islamic	  State.	  When	  I	  proposed	  this	  idea	  to	  Mira,	  Sarah,	  and	  Ahmad,	  they	  all	  said	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  truth	  to	  this	  deceiving	  agreement.	  Unanimously,	  they	  all	  agreed	  that	  even	  if	  Assad	  promised	  an	  alliance	  with	  America,	  there	  would	  still	  be	  undercover	  cooperation	  between	  his	  regime	  and	  ISIS.	  As	  I	  explained	  earlier,	  ISIS’	  control	  of	  oil	  fields	  has	  benefitted	  them	  as	  a	  means	  to	  generate	  profit,	  especially	  with	  the	  regime.	  Numerous	  
50	  	  reports,	  aside	  from	  my	  own	  interviews,	  accuse	  and	  confirm	  the	  regime’s	  cooperation	  in	  buying	  oil	  from	  ISIS28.	  Nonetheless,	  there	  is	  little	  to	  no	  hard	  evidence	  of	  these	  exchanges.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  regime	  and	  ISIS	  operations,	  Assad	  has	  not	  come	  forward	  with	  any	  statements	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  groups.	  However,	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  most	  specifically	  Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Kerry,	  ISIS	  and	  Assad	  are	  ‘dependent’	  on	  one	  another,	  because	  of	  their	  corresponding	  attacks,	  which	  happen	  to	  miss	  each	  other’s	  areas29.	  	   The	  unfortunate	  part	  about	  this	  hypothetical	  scenario	  is	  that	  it	  is	  all	  based	  off	  of	  assumption	  and	  personal	  experience	  that	  is	  not	  my	  own.	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  a	  U.S.-­‐Syrian	  agreement	  will	  exist	  as	  a	  resolution	  to	  the	  conflict	  with	  ISIS,	  and	  eventually	  Assad.	  The	  conflict	  in	  Syria	  now	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  fight	  between	  sides.	  Dr.	  Najib	  Ghadbian	  tells	  me	  that	  the	  regime’s	  control	  of	  Damascus	  and	  coastal	  areas	  gives	  them	  an	  advantage	  at	  bombing	  the	  liberated	  revolution	  areas.	  But	  the	  support	  doesn’t	  stop	  at	  the	  border.	  As	  Dr.	  Ghadbian	  explained	  to	  me,	  Iran’s	  continuous	  support	  to	  Assad	  gives	  him	  momentum	  against	  the	  revolution.	  ISIS	  has	  seized	  parts	  of	  Eastern	  Syria,	  and	  most	  recently,	  the	  Yarmouk	  Refugee	  Camp	  in	  Damascus.	  Not	  only	  was	  this	  area	  highly	  populated	  with	  rebels,	  but	  also	  this	  camp	  is	  home	  to	  almost	  18,000	  refugees,	  many	  of	  whom	  are	  Palestinian30.	  Dr.	  Ghadbian	  says	  that	  seizing	  the	  camp	  is	  impossible	  “without	  the	  regime’s	  implicit	  cooperation”	  with	  ISIS.	  And	  while	  ISIS	  and	  the	  rebels	  work	  together,	  the	  Free	  Syrian	  Army	  is	  now	  battling	  both.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  As	  I	  mentioned	  previously,	  oil	  ISIS	  essentially	  sells	  back	  the	  oil	  to	  the	  regime	  at	  a	  cheaper	  rate.	  	  29	  Sec.	  of	  State	  Kerry	  said	  that	  Assad	  ’purports’	  the	  last	  line	  of	  defense	  against	  the	  terrorist	  group,	  making	  them	  stronger.	  He	  said	  that	  they	  have	  a	  ‘symbiotic’	  relationship	  (Ratnam	  and	  Hudson).	  30	  Dr.	  Ghadbian	  told	  me	  that	  cooperation	  between	  the	  regime	  and	  ISIS	  helped	  them	  get	  into	  the	  camp.	  Reports	  of	  potential	  beheadings	  have	  been	  released.	  FSA	  members	  along	  with	  Palestinian	  militias	  are	  taking	  on	  a	  fight	  against	  ISIS.	  	  
51	  	  	   However,	  I	  believe	  that	  a	  U.S.-­‐Syrian	  deal	  to	  democratize	  can	  exist,	  but	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  it	  will	  happen	  while	  Assad	  is	  in	  power.	  The	  united	  state	  is	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  battle	  heads	  with	  Iran,	  especially	  considering	  the	  rising	  tensions	  on	  nuclear	  agreements	  between	  the	  countries.	  While	  I	  had	  hoped	  that	  a	  temporary	  agreement	  might	  be	  the	  first	  step	  in	  developing	  some	  type	  of	  political	  agreement	  with	  Iran,	  it	  no	  longer	  seems	  like	  a	  logical	  solution.	  Iran’s	  governmental	  structure	  and	  support	  of	  Hezbollah	  puts	  a	  red	  flag	  on	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  negotiations.	  Their	  power	  in	  the	  middle	  east	  is	  prevalent,	  and	  if	  the	  United	  States	  comes	  out	  to	  work	  with	  them	  on	  a	  regional	  stabilization	  plan,	  then	  the	  Americans	  as	  well	  as	  Israel	  as	  a	  channel	  to	  negotiate	  terrorism	  will	  criticize	  our	  government.	  In	  reality,	  I	  believe	  that	  if	  we	  want	  to	  get	  into	  Syria	  while	  Assad	  is	  there,	  we	  need	  Iran’s	  help.	  Realistically,	  this	  will	  not	  happen.	  Therefore,	  my	  concluding	  hypothetical	  scenario	  goes	  back	  to	  drafting	  a	  transitional-­‐democratic	  framework	  to	  take	  place	  if	  and	  when	  Assad	  is	  removed	  from	  power.	  I	  still	  have	  hope	  that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  final	  term	  in	  2021,	  dramatic	  developments	  would	  have	  been	  made	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  transparent	  and	  supervised	  election	  to	  take	  place	  in	  Syria.	  If	  the	  United	  States	  can	  work	  with	  neighboring	  countries	  like	  Jordan	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  plan	  that	  will	  allow	  for	  a	  temporary	  government	  to	  hold	  office	  until	  the	  new	  democracy	  is	  established,	  then	  I	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  hope	  for	  a	  democratized	  Syria.	  	   Of	  all	  my	  hypothetical	  conclusions,	  I	  feel	  the	  most	  strongly	  about	  my	  analysis	  of	  Syria	  under	  the	  Dayton	  Agreement..	  This	  topic	  needs	  extensive	  attention,	  especially	  considering	  how	  the	  Syrian	  regime	  progresses	  each	  day.	  In	  this	  moment,	  I	  believe	  that	  in	  possibly	  ten	  years,	  creating	  a	  democracy	  in	  Syria	  using	  the	  Dayton	  Agreement	  will	  be	  
52	  	  an	  ideal	  topic	  for	  discussion.	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  the	  country	  is	  far	  off	  from	  needing	  something	  like	  this;	  however,	  my	  only	  advice	  to	  this	  hypothetical	  scenario	  is	  that	  the	  powers	  that	  come	  to	  assist	  in	  monitoring	  and	  drafting	  the	  framework	  have	  no	  affiliation	  with	  the	  Assad	  regime.	  If	  we	  hope	  to	  have	  a	  free	  Syria	  one	  day,	  we	  need	  to	  wash	  it	  clean	  of	  the	  long-­‐living	  power	  that	  destroyed	  it.	  A	  new	  Syria	  means	  a	  new	  set	  of	  ideas,	  a	  new	  set	  of	  powers,	  and	  a	  new	  framework	  with	  new	  ideals	  for	  the	  country.	  I	  believe	  that	  a	  free	  Syria	  is	  a	  reality	  that	  is	  off	  to	  the	  distance.	  However,	  the	  Assad	  regime	  took	  the	  world	  by	  surprise	  out	  of	  nowhere,	  and	  we	  were	  not	  prepared.	  An	  opportunity	  for	  a	  free	  Syria	  could	  be	  right	  around	  the	  corner	  by	  2021,	  and	  I	  believe	  that	  if	  I	  continue	  to	  follow	  this	  path	  in	  my	  research,	  I	  can	  help	  be	  a	  part	  of	  creating	  this	  free	  Syria.	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